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Abstract
While some US policymakers argue that economic sanctions always work and continue
to use them as a key foreign policy tool, and while some other scholars argue that sanctions
never work, this thesis focuses on when, not if, sanctions work. Contextualizing a discussion of
the effectiveness of sanctioning undemocratic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa
around the early 2000s shift away from US hegemony back to multipolarity, I conclude that the
rise of Russia, China, and smaller states in the early 2000s affected the process through which
the US is able to sanction adversarial regimes. Through an analysis of six case studies, I show
that pressure to adopt political reforms more favorable to the US through economic sanctions
alone has not been successful regardless of global power dynamics. Although such sanctions
consistently have limited success, the end of unipolarity gave previously less powerful states
room to not only oppose but actively work against US sanctions regimes. The governments of
Sudan, Syria, and Iran were given more opportunities to work around US sanctions legally
through access to markets in other states. This ability of US adversaries to affect its sanctions
regimes alters the costs imposed on the states targeted by sanctions and makes it more likely that
the US will act alone in its imposition of sanctions. In a multipolar world, as opposed to a
unipolar one under US hegemony, the US will encounter not only more difficulty in garnering
international support for its policies, but also more difficultly in bringing about lasting change in
the states it sanctions.

i

Chapter One: Introduction
Throughout the final years of the Cold War and following its conclusion, economic
sanctions became an increasingly central tool of global governance used by states to advance
their interests abroad. In the mid-twentieth century, only five states were targeted by sanctions
aimed at pushing regimes to make political changes; as a result of the continued desire of states
to maintain influence abroad, by 2000 nearly fifty states were sanctioned.1 These sanctions
involved the United States or international organizations as the senders of sanctions attempting
to coerce targeted governments to make political changes by restricting economic interactions
within target states. Such restrictions included trade, investment, banking, travel, and arms sales.
The increased use of sanctions spurred a debate in political and academic discourses that has
disaggregated into two broad schools of thought: (1) sanctions advocates and (2) sanctions
opponents. While the debate and these schools of thought changed overtime, no prevailing
argument has come to be shared by the states and organizations that most often impose sanctions.
Different opinions on the use of sanctions are held not only by different western governments but
even by different US administrations as well. Nonetheless, the use of sanctions persists.
While the continuance of the debate in the academic literature has yet to lead to a shared
understanding of the effects of sanctioning undemocratic regimes, what has always been clear is
that the effectiveness of sanctions must be understood in the context of contemporary
geopolitics. Foreign policy is not conducted in a vacuum, and states’ relative power has an effect
on policy outcomes. The changing geopolitics in the decades following the end of the Cold War
are especially pertinent to discussing sanctions, as the shift to US unipolarity was coupled with
the aforementioned increase in sanctions regimes around the world. As the 1990s came to a close
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Lee Jones, ed., Societies Under Siege: Exploring How International Economic Sanctions (Do Not) Work. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015), 1.
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and the post-9/11 wars of the early 2000s began, a decade of US hegemony defined by
unprecedented rates of support for US policies ended. The inability of the US by the early 2000s
to garner the same level of international support as it was able to just years prior affected the
arguments of many scholars regarding the effectiveness, ethics, and legality of sanctioning
undemocratic regimes.
Although the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, respectively, aided
in bringing about the end of its own hegemonic power and thus fundamentally affected the
effectiveness of sanctions, the two schools of thought continue to persist in the academic
literature. In the following chapters, I will break through this debate surrounding economic
sanctions regimes in undemocratic states. In sorting through the arguments made in both schools
of thought and analyzing a new set of cases, I will analyze how the shift from a unipolar world to
a multipolar one has affected the effectiveness of sanctions targeting undemocratic regimes in
bringing about desired policy changes. In contextualizing the debate on sanctions around the
geopolitical shifts following the end of the Cold War and the post-9/11 wars, I hypothesize
that—while sanctioning autocrats has never been perfectly effective—the end of unipolarity has
solidified the inability of the US to successfully bring about political changes in undemocratic
states through economic sanctions alone. I hypothesize that it is now more likely that a great or
growing power will not only oppose but actively work against US sanctions regimes. This
argument supports the segment of the existing literature claiming that sanctioning undemocratic
actors is ineffective.
Beginning with a discussion of the arguments made within this debate, as well as
arguments made throughout the 1990s regarding US dominance and power, I will continue on to
present and judge a set of cases in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Chapter Two
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addresses the existing literature on sanctions as well as theories regarding US unipolarity and
power. In this chapter, I analyze scholars’ differing definitions of state power and present my
own. States’ relative power is the independent variable in my hypothesis, and defining it with
precision and care is important to further analysis of this hypothesis. In Chapter Two, I also
discuss in detail the two schools of thought that my final conclusion breaks through. Using the
explanations of both US hegemony and the academic debate on sanctions as background,
Chapter Three goes on to define the dependent variable of my hypothesis as well as lay out the
criteria against which the cases of sanctions regimes in the successive chapters are judged.
Chapter Four explains my process of case selection, and Chapters Five through Ten present each
case study for analysis.
I end this thesis with the conclusion that the end of US hegemony changed the process
through which these sanctions come about. My analysis, however, does not show a significant
variation in the effectiveness of US sanctions policy following the end of US hegemony. Russia,
China, and smaller states have gained the ability to more successfully challenge US-led sanctions
regimes and actively work against the sanctions to provide alternative economic pathways to
targeted regimes. Economic sanctions imposed against belligerent regimes in MENA with the
intention of pushing these regimes to adopt new policies more favorable to the US have never
been consistently successful—as is demonstrated in Chapters Five through Ten. The context
under which these sanctions regimes were imposed and complied with, I conclude, changed with
the end of US hegemony.

Chapter Two: Literature Review
The growth in the use of sanctions by western powers in the 1990s brought with it
concerns from academics and policymakers alike about the effectiveness of sanctioning regimes
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that acted counter to United States and western interests. A debate in the foreign economic policy
literature ensued focusing on the perceived unique ability of authoritarian regimes to evade
sanctions pressures and maintain their adversarial policies. The catalyst for involvement in this
debate for many was the observable humanitarian consequences of sanctions regimes in
undemocratic states. The difficulty of approving humanitarian exports to sanctioned states as
well as the inconsistency in application of sanctions regimes between cases led not only to
considerable human suffering within targeted states but also to many scholars contributing to the
evolving discourse.2
What follows in this chapter will be an analysis of the large body of literature regarding
the effectiveness of sanctioning adversarial regimes. Covering a vast array of arguments, this
body of literature has segmented into two broad schools of thought: (1) one arguing for the
continued use of economic sanctions against any regime no matter their respect for democracy
and (2) another arguing against the sanctioning of undemocratic regimes altogether. While all
scholars involved in the debate discussed below recognize the conventional wisdom that
sanctioning undemocratic leaders most often begets further repression, the conclusions made
throughout the literature vary significantly. Sanctions advocates generally prioritize the ability of
sanctions against undemocratic regimes to achieve substantive ends even if they do not fully
achieve the ambitious objectives stated at the onset of the policies.3 Conversely, sanctions
opponents generally focus on the large failure rate of sanctions to achieve their stated goals
accompanied by the human suffering experienced by civilian populations to argue that sanctions
are not only ineffective but costly.

2
Thomas Weiss et al. ed., Political Gain and Civilian Pain: Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions.
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 219.
3
Richard Haass, conclusion to Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy, ed. Richard Haass (The Council on
Foreign Relations, 1998), 198.
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The intricacies and diversity of each school of thought will be discussed in greater detail,
but it is first important to contextualize both arguments—and the sanctions policies themselves—
within contemporary geopolitics. The decade following the end of the Cold War was a time of
changing global politics when US and Russian bipolarity shifted to US unipolarity. As the
former communist bloc turned to the US, striving to adopt its political and economic principles,
the US experienced a time of great global influence and power. This era of unipolarity came to a
close, however, as US-led globalization generated a backlash around the world, and the vast
power that the US was able to wield globally greatly diminished. This transition back to a
multipolar world in the early 2000s considerably affected the ability of the US and its allies to
achieve foreign policy successes. Western policies are now challenged to a larger—and more
successful—extent by the growing global powers of Russia and China and occasionally even by
allies themselves. While scholars on both sides of the debate discussed below focus on events far
beyond the 1990s and the end of US unipolarity, the transition back to a multipolar world must
be taken into consideration when attempting to analyze the two schools of thought.
A Changing World: The Effects of Evolving Polarity on US Influence
When the Soviet Union began to fall in the late 1980s, scholars began to predict what
would come of the world after decades of bipolarity. These predictions—later largely supported
by empirical data—centered around the notion of US world leadership. While scholarship
differed regarding confidence in the durability of a unipolar world, considerable agreement arose
that the US would lead global politics at least in the short term and that, during this time of
leadership, US policies would be supported by a broad segment of the global community. To
some scholars, America’s authority over international liberalism and institutionalism would
result in the success of foreign policies based on these ideologies long after the fall of
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communism even if the institutions through which many US policies were carried out did not
themselves succeed.4 Others were not as optimistic about the persistence of a US hegemon, but
they did concede that such a hegemon—albeit a short-lived one—was forthcoming. Empirical
data collected after these predictions of unipolarity were made largely supported them. The US
experienced a time of unipolar leadership throughout the 1990s, and its dominance intensified
throughout the decade.5 This dominance was challenged, however, as the wars of the early 2000s
began, and Russia and China began to grow significantly; the unipolar influence once
experienced by the US was eventually lost.
Expectations of Unipolarity
Scholars began to analyze what could follow the bipolarity experienced throughout the
Cold War before it had even ended. In 1989, two years before the fall of the Soviet Union,
Fukuyama made one of the most optimistic and triumphalist predictions of what was to follow
the geopolitics of the Cold War. This viewpoint asserted that the twentieth century would end the
same way it began: with the global community converging to the capitalist market economy,
liberal institutionalism, and democracy as the fundamental and necessary aspects of stable global
governance.6 From a US perspective, this argument asserted that the US would experience not
only a time of ideological predominance but also one of international support unlike anything
experienced throughout the Cold War. Many US policymakers agreed with Fukuyama’s
assessment that liberal institutionalism led by the US would eventually be adopted by the
majority of the global community, but they recognized that the US had to work hard to make

4
Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989), 3, and John J. Mearsheimer,
“The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19 (Winter 1994-1995), 5-49.
5
Charles Kauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” The National Interest (Winter 2002/2003), 5.
6
Fukuyama, 4.
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such a thing happen.7 In a 1992 draft report released to the press, US Department of Defense
officials argued that, in order to ensure that the US maintained support for its policies on a global
scale, the rise of second-tier states needed to be controlled in such a way that ensured they
remained less powerful than the US. Academics such as William Wohlforth argued that the
duration of US hegemony and the disparity in power between the US and mid-level states were
unprecedented. He emphasized, however, that US hegemony could be threatened by the inability
of the US to stymie the growth of any potential adversaries and competitors, as these potential
competitors did not value the predominance of US international liberalism.8 Like Wohlforth and
Pentagon officials, many other scholars agreed with Fukuyama that the US would emerge from
the Cold War as a global leader in economic and military strength, but they did not necessarily
believe that liberal democracy would be the predominant ideology around the world for decades
to come.
This fear of the possible growth of smaller states by US officials and other scholars was
often coupled with an argument that these smaller states, in attempting to grow and compete with
the hegemon, would find themselves in conflict with one another. Krauthammer—who wrote in
support of his initial argument years later—acknowledged this possibility that smaller states,
namely European states, would fight one another in order to acquire as much power as possible.9
Smaller states, it was argued, in feeling insecure about their power relative to that of the US,
would oppose and attempt to stop US policies in order to foster their own international influence.
Like Wohlforth, Krauthammer also believed in the possible loss of America’s global influence
and argued that US hegemony would persist so long as the right steps were taken to protect it.

7

Patrick E. Tyler, “Lone Superpower Plan: Ammunition for Critics,” The New York Times. March 10, 1992.
William Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24 (Summer 1999), 5-41.
9
Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70 (1990-1991), 23-33.
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Others were not as confident in the ability of the US or its liberal values to maintain US
predominance, however. Scholars such as Mearsheimer and Layne argued that this conflict
among smaller states vying for power could not be stopped by US actions alone but would
instead lead back to a multipolar world. Mearsheimer suggested that Fukuyama, Wohlforth, and
Krauthammer’s arguments were only true to the extent that US policymakers believed them to
be. Rather than liberal institutionalism becoming accepted globally and the US remaining the
leader of a unipolar world for any period of time to follow, Mearsheimer argued that the rising
competition among mid-level states would eventually lead to some gaining power that rivaled
that of the US, as international institutions began to fail in the 1990s.10 Instability was predicted
to return to Europe as smaller states were given the opportunity to fight for more power and
influence without the fear of retaliation from either of the Cold War great powers.11 This
argument was supported by Layne who argued that—even though the US acted in regard to
second-tier states more so with benevolence than the coercion it used throughout the Cold War—
states would attempt to balance against the hegemon and challenge its power.12 Countering
Wohlforth’s argument about the unprecedented nature of the unipolarity of the 1990s as well as
the arguments predicting the indefinite continuation of US hegemony, Kupchan argued that
multipolarity would return as it always had following postwar lulls in international competition.
While economic globalization, nuclear weapons, new information technologies, and the spread
of democracy could have tamed some rivalries and necessitated cooperation between states in
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Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions.”
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some cases, Kupchan argued that the US would no longer experience the international support it
had immediately following the fall of the Soviet Union.13
Neorealists—who believe that power is the paramount factor in international relations—
viewed unipolarity as unstable in and of itself.14 Kenneth Waltz, the leading advocate of
neorealist theory, described the unbalanced and unchecked power experienced by one state in a
time of unipolarity as being as dangerous to national politics as it is to international politics;
small states will attempt to fill a power vacuum by any means necessary.15 To neorealists, the US
would have the power in the short term to experience global support for its policies, but this
hegemony was not only fleeting but unstable for the future of both geopolitics and US domestic
politics. Expecting America’s allies and international institutions to back US policies was
deemed dangerous by neorealists, since the support would only exist in the short term.
The Reality of Unipolarity and the Operationalizing of Power
Although there were many different opinions regarding the future of US dominance
following the end of the Cold War, and the stability of unipolarity was contested, scholars did
agree that the US would experience at least a short stretch of international dominance. Such US
dominance was experienced in the years following the Cold War. Tables One and Two below, in
illustrating some indicators of power, show how these indices of power for the US changed
following the end of the Cold War and then continued to trend toward an equilibrium among the
great powers in the mid-2000s. While these two tables do not reflect a perfect assessment of
global power, and power itself is difficult to define, viewed together and in conjunction with

13

Charles A. Kupchan, “Life after Pax Americana,” World Policy Journal 16 (Fall, 1999), 20-27.
Wohlforth, 5.
15
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” The American Political Science Review 91 (December 1997), 913-917.
14
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analysis of what makes a specific state powerful, they nonetheless illustrate America’s relative
share of global strength and wealth.
Power—especially in discussions of politics—is a term often used but rarely defined. It is
plagues by vagueness. In this thesis, however, it plays a key role as a variable affecting the
ability of a state to achieve its goals set at the onset of a sanctions regime, so it needs to be
defined with care and precision. Therefore, I define power as the ability of a state to influence
the behavior of another—either implicitly or explicitly—in order to achieve the powerful actor’s
desired outcome. While some scholars define power more simply as the ability of an actor to get
what it wants, it is important to note that power is not defined here by outcomes—as Russett and
Starr define it—but by the ability to affect the actions of others when working toward desired
outcomes.16 As power is a means in achieving different objectives, achieving one’s objective is
simply a byproduct of power, and power cannot be conflated with outcomes. In attempting to
breakthrough what he believed to be the overuse of terms such as power and influence, Dahl
defines power in this same way, as the ability of State A to exert influence over State B in such a
way that brings about A’s desired outcomes.17 These affected actions taken by the less powerful
state must also be beyond the purview of how the influenced actor already conducts itself,
however.18 This is to say that power is not asserted when a dictator imprisons a dissident who
already desired to be a martyr, since the dissident would presumably carry out similar actions
without external pressure.
The ability of one state to coerce another when working toward a desired end, like most
topics in international relations, must be understood in the context of how states interact and

16
Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, 3rd ed. (New York: W. H. Freeman and
Company, 1989), 127.
17
Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis Fourth Edition. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1984), 22-25.
18
Joseph Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 2.
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depend on one another. Keohane and Nye write about the power of interdependence as the ability
of one state to exploit a mutually dependent relationship it has with another.19 Even the neorealist
Waltz, who sees the world as anarchic at its core, recognizes that states not only are affected by
one another but rely on one another at times.20 In a self-help world, as Waltz sees it, every state
works not only to benefit itself but also to protect itself from others, and this protection can come
in the forms of both cooperation and exploitation of interdependent relationships. These acts,
cooperation and exploitation, are examples of how a state’s power can be used. Whether or not
another state changes its usual course of action to adapt to the demands made through
cooperation or exploitation is a reflection of the weight of one state’s power over another; the
eventual outcome of cooperation and exploitation simply demonstrates the successfulness of the
use of a state’s power.
While the ability of a state to coerce another into action can be used to indicate a state’s
successful use of power,21 material wealth and military size are also indicators of a state’s power;
these are the indices reflected in Tables One and Two.22 While soft power—a term coined by
Nye that incorporates values, culture, and cooperation into the definition of power—is
instrumental in acts of coercion, wealth and military might are instrumental in ensuring that less
powerful states understand the possible consequences of not acquiescing to a powerful state’s
desires. Laïdi also recognizes this differentiation between soft power and hard power, defining a
state’s power primarily as its material wealth and strength but also recognizing the importance of

19

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed. (Boston: Scott, Foresman and Company,
1989), 11.
20
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979),
104.
21
Robert Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science 3 (December 1957), 201–215.
22
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, updated ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
2014), 55-137.
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Table One: Indicators of Great Powers’ Wealth and Population
1985
1990
1995

2000

2005

GDP (trillion)
United States

4.339

5.963

7.640

10.252

13.037

China

0.3095

0.3609

0.7345

1.211

2.286

Germany

0.7298

1.772

2.592

1.943

2.861

USSR/Russia

2.200

0.5168

0.3955

0.2597

0.7640

Japan

1.399

3.133

5.449

4.888

4.755

33.9

26.3

24.8

30.5

27.5

China

2.4

1.6

2.4

3.6

4.8

Germany

5.7

7.8

8.4

5.8

6.0

USSR/Russia

17.2

2.3

1.3

0.8

1.6

Japan

10.9

13.8

17.7

14.6

10.0

13.3

12.8

12.6

13.8

10.1

China

1.1

1.1

2.1

3.2

6.0

Germany

7.4

9.4

8.9

7.6

8.4

--

2.2

1.8

1.4

2.1

8.5

7.4

7.6

6.6

5.2

237.9

249.6

262.8

282.2

296.4

1,051.0

1,135.0

1,205.0

1,263.0

1,305.0

77.7

79.4

81.7

82.2

82.5

USSR/Russia

286.7

148.3

148.4

146.6

143.5

Japan

120.8

123.5

125.4

126.8

127.8

Relative Share of
Global Wealth (%)
US

Relative Value of
Global Exports (%
of global value)
US

USSR/Russia
Japan
Population
(million)
US
China
Germany

NOTE: GDP figures are in Feb. 2020 US dollars. Empirical export data for the Soviet Union in 1985 was
unavailable, but it was noted by Abraham Becker in his November 1987 “US-Soviet Trade in the 1980s” report for
the RAND Corporation that Soviet trade with developed states declined in the first half of the 1980s and was largely
driven by Soviet imports of agricultural goods.
SOURCES: US Census Bureau Historical National Population Estimates (https://www.census.gov/population/
estimates/nation/popclockest.txt), and World Bank Open Data (https://data.worldbank.org/).
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Table Two: Indicators of Great Powers’ Military Strength
1985
1990
1995

2000

2005

Military
Expenditures (% of
GDP)
United States

6.1

5.3

3.6

2.9

3.9

China

2.5

2.5

1.7

1.9

2.0

Germany

3.0

2.7

1.6

1.4

1.3

12.6

9.0

3.8

3.3

3.3

1.0

0.9

0.9

0.9

0.9

US

0.9

0.8

0.6

0.5

0.5

China

0.4

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.3

Germany

0.6

0.7

0.4

0.3

0.3

USSR/Russia

1.8

2.9

1.2

1.0

1.0

Japan

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

USSR/Russia
Japan
Armed Forces (% of
population)

NOTE: The estimated burden of Soviet military expenditures is represented as a percentage of the state’s GNP
rather than its GDP.
SOURCES: Shaoguang Wang, “Estimating Defense Expenditure: Some Evidence from Chinese Sources,” The
China Quarterly 147 (September 1996), 896.; Dmitri Steinberg, “Trends in Soviet Military Expenditure,” Soviet
Studies 42 (October 1990), 676.; Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Military Manpower: Sizing the Force”
(August 1990); and World Bank Open Data (https://data.worldbank.org/).

one’s ideology—or “meaning”—especially during the Cold War.23 Zakaria illustrates the
positive relationship experienced throughout history between wealthy states and powerful states
who entangle themselves in politics beyond their borders,24 and Mearsheimer goes further to
define power solely on the wealth and material assets of a state.25
Although Mearsheimer, in providing a realist analysis of military strength and power,
focuses on material wealth as opposed to soft power and non-military interactions between

23

Zaki Laïdi, A World Without Meaning: The Crisis of Meaning in International Politics, trans. June Burnham and
Jenny Coulon (London: Routledge, 1998), 20-21.
24
Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1998).
25
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 57.
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states, he does provide some valuable indicators through which material power can be measured.
Material wealth is an important indicator of states’ power because it reflects the capabilities of a
state, and it is argued that a state with few capabilities cannot be a powerful one. Similarly, E. H.
Carr, another figure closely associated with realist theory, defines power first and foremost as
military and economic strength, only recognizing the importance of a state’s power over opinion
to the extent that such power drives favorable international agreements or alliances that may
stave off inevitable war.26 It is this aspect of power, a state’s material wealth and size, that is
reflected in both Tables One and Two through measures of wealth, size and military capabilities.
All scholars of international relations who work to define power allude to the distinction
between power as capability and relational power. The former is illustrated in Tables One and
Two; power as capability is marked by the metrics of economic strength and military might. I am
concerned here, however, with relational power: my key variable. This is the type of power that
Dahl stresses: power to compel or deter an ally or an adversary to change its course of action and
adopt policies more favorable to the powerful state. As America’s relational power rose relative
to other states throughout the 1990s, the US was able to pass successful and internationally
supported policies, as reflected in favorable votes on US policies in international institutions.
Beginning with UN authorization for the US-led military involvement in Iraq in 1990, and
continuing throughout the decade, the US succeeded in gaining international support not only for
its interventionist policies but for its economic and trade policies as well. President Clinton’s
assertive multilateralism—and even his decisions not to intervene in some cases—was supported
by the UN in places as diverse as Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia.27 America’s interest in
liberal institutionalism also spread in the form of the expansion of the European Union and North
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Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) throughout the decade. These institutions that bolstered
the US began to falter, however, as Russia began to rebuild its strength in the early 2000s.
By the late 1990s, the increased instability among European states vying for power—as
predicted by some scholars of geopolitics—as well as Russia’s recovery led to a waning in the
international support for the US. International and regional institutions were seen by some to
have failed to bring about the stable international order with which they were tasked.28 Whether
or not these institutions failed is beyond the scope of this paper, but the data does show a
decrease in support for US policies and an increasingly multipolar world throughout the late
1990s. By 1999, the US and its closest military allies in NATO were denied UN authorization for
their desired intervention in Kosovo, and they were forced to act beyond the scope of
international law. As the relative power distribution began to change at the end of the decade,
China and Russia had gained enough economic and ideological strength in the international
community to feel confident blocking US policies in the UN Security Council (UNSC).29 Even
though the US had no great power enemies in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it faced a
continuing threat to its international influence as smaller states as well as China and Russia
worked to balance their material power against that of the US, as neorealists had predicted earlier
in the decade.30 The transition back to a multipolar world in the early 2000s, as the US began to
lose dominance in international institutions, brought with it not only a lack of support for US
foreign policies internationally but a decrease in the effectiveness of these policies.
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Sanctions Advocates
Some scholars and policymakers advocating for sanctions do so based on the notion that
an increasingly globalized world actually aids in the effectiveness of sanctions unilaterally
applied by the US. While all in this school of thought ground their arguments in the notion that
economic deprivation leads to political change, there are differences within this side of the
debate regarding when such economic deprivation is the most potent.31 Kaempfer and
Lowenberg argue that internationally supported sanctions applied multilaterally or through
international institutions work to undermine the political power of opposition groups within the
targeted states, pushing citizens to support the sanctioned regime as the only body able to support
them in a time of economic deprivation. Through this understanding of large-scale sanctions
driving domestic constituencies to support a sanctioned regime, the scholars argue instead in
favor of economic sanctions applied by only one close trading partner of the targeted regime.32
O’Sullivan furthered this argument to an extent, arguing that the US exclusively has the power to
affect change through unilateral sanctions, but even this unique ability is successful only in the
short term.33 Recognizing that this argument runs counter to the understanding that a globalized
world will lead to more effective economic sanctions when a multitude of states carry such
policies out, O’Sullivan claims that the US maintains an influential standing internationally that
allows its unilateral sanctions to achieve a limited amount of success.
O’Sullivan goes on, however, to argue—like the majority of sanctions advocates—that
economic sanctions are most effective when imposed by an international coalition or institution.
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Using the term “springboard sanctions” to define the sanctions she believes to be the most
effective, O’Sullivan contends that sanctions that begin with one sender state and springboard to
the broader international community are the only policies with a large enough economic impact
in the target state to bring about the economic pressure necessary to drive political change.34
Other scholars such as Bapat and Morgan, Doxy, and Wallensteen et al. at the Stockholm
Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions agree with this argument in favor of
multilateral sanctions. These scholars add to their arguments the need for such internationally
supported policies to also be limited and single-issue. Bapat and Morgan claim that
comprehensive sanctions—covering large swaths of the target state’s economy—are too broad
and do not focus enough on the issues the senders have with the target state’s actions.35 Doxy
and the Stockholm Process scholars agree, asserting that multilateral targeted sanctions are the
only effective sanctions policies. Like Staibano below, those scholars in the Stockholm Process
argue that sanctions need to be not only narrow in scope, but they need to focus on specific
individuals who are instrumental in adversarial regimes.36 It is not enough to simply restrict
certain troublesome aspects of a state’s economy, but the individuals who bolster these segments
of a target state’s economy must be sanctioned themselves. Doxy goes on to argue that
successful sanctions are often coupled with other diplomatic efforts or even—if success does not
seem imminent—the use of force, as they cannot often achieve ambitious outcomes.37
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Continuing with arguments in favor of limited, multilaterally applied sanctions, Staibano
agrees that for sanctions to succeed they must be limited not only to specific sectors of a state’s
economy but also to specific people and businesses that support a state’s regime. Through
international institutions, Staibano argues, targeted or so-called smart sanctions are able to affect
changes in an adversarial regime’s policies. She does recognize, however—like Mearsheimer—
that international institutions are flawed, and some changes within them are needed to ensure that
sanctions regimes not only are supported internationally but have the resources necessary for
success, such as continued assessment and reshaping of the sanctions regimes when necessary.38
There are those scholars who, in focusing on the types of sanctions regimes that are able
to achieve their stated goals, present some doubt in the effectiveness of sanctions but argue that
they will—and should—continue to be used. Jones furthers the arguments made in favor of smart
sanctions but recognizes the conventionally accepted wisdom that sanctions cause adverse
civilian consequences in targeted states. Despite this, Jones argues, smart sanctions will and
should continue to be used by western states against members and supporters of undemocratic
regimes, as they are perceived to be the least disruptive policy options and also bolster domestic
politics within sender states.39 While asserting that comprehensive sanctions are immoral and
rarely succeed, Jones and other scholars like Early and Alexander argue that there is still a
possibility that sanctions can succeed. Early and Alexander do not focus on the scale of
sanctions—whether they are comprehensive or limited; they instead focus on whether they are
applied multilaterally or unilaterally. Focusing on the ability of third parties to “bust” sanctions
and provide alternative markets as well as on the history of this practice, Early claims that
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sanction-busting can be expected, so international support and thoughtful implementation of
sanctions can lessen the ability of other states to be busters.40 Alexander, also focusing on the
need for international support, argues that only sanctions regimes with support from the most
financially powerful states in the world have a chance of reaching their goals.41
The scholars arguing in favor of the use of sanctions do not only focus on what types of
sanctions have the ability to succeed, however. Grounding their assertions in the aforementioned
notion that an economically deprived state cannot continue to be an adversarial one, sanctions
advocates go on to argue simply that sanctions are the preferable and least costly alternative to
other policies, especially military conflict.42 While all scholars—as seen above—contend that
specific types of sanctions work better than others, some focus specifically on the argument that
sanctions do, at times, achieve their stated goals of affecting policy changes in targeted states and
can be seen as an alternative to policies more costly to the sender states.43 Hufbauer et al. offered
a set of cases purporting to show a large percentage of successful sanctions policies. In analyzing
the cases selected, the scholars contend that the financial leverage and intensity of interest of the
sender state relative to the target of sanctions predicts the success of sanctions; the more
economically powerful and interested a sender of sanctions is, they argue, the more likely the
stated goal of the policy will be achieved.44 Peterson’s work supports this argument by
contending that those states with internationally important industries have high leverage as
senders of sanctions. He argues that a state with high value to its trade partners has the ability to
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force change in any of its partners’ politics through sanctions because of this relatively increased
leverage.45
Even when the goal of sanctions regimes is the lofty objective of driving a target state
toward greater democratization—as opposed to smaller policy changes—some scholars continue
to assert that such democratizing sanctions are successful. Again using a large case selection to
demonstrate a large percentage of perceived successes, scholars such as Geddes, von Soest, and
Wahman purport that a turn toward democracy from authoritarianism is expected during
economic downturns, as influential constituencies—most notably military cadres—lose support
for the undemocratic regime.46 Von Soest and Wahman take this argument further than Geddes
to claim that not only does democratization occur in times of economic deprivation, but
economic sanctions can be part of a larger strategy that sparks such deprivation.47 While
sanctions may not be the only factor that leads to a state’s liberalization, it is argued that
sanctions have a positive relationship with future democracy in previously illiberal states.
Sanctions Opponents
Opponents of sanctions fundamentally agree with many sanctions advocates that
sanctions do not always achieve their ambitious stated purposes. They take this further, however,
to argue that sanctions fail not only to bring about the large-scale changes they were intended to
produce but also to protect the civilians within the target states. Changing the criteria of success,
opponents of sanctions do not believe that a small political change in a target state can be
considered success; instead, success is observed when the goal laid out at the onset of a sanctions
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regime is reached fully. This, sanctions opponents argue, rarely happens. Focusing on the
conventional wisdom that sanctioning undemocratic leaders begets further repression, this school
of thought has also expanded to include ethics scholars who use the unintended civilian
consequences alone as a reason to end the use of economic sanctions.
Beginning with arguments made against the use of sanctions based on a perceived high
failure rate of sanctions, Niblock and Haass concede that sanctions may lead to some small
policy changes in an undemocratic state facing economic pressure but argue that this is not
enough to declare a sanctions regime effective. In arguing that economic sanctions work adverse
to the building of a social basis necessary in a democracy and undermine the long term political
stability of a targeted state, Niblock asserts that sanctions strengthen undemocratic regimes.48
Similarly, Haass compiles a case selection through which he shows that, although small changes
can be attained, autocrats can withstand the effects of sanctions through the use of illicit markets
and the exploitation of the adverse, unintended consequences of sanctions.49 To these scholars,
sanctions can be not only busted—as was demonstrated during the Cold War when the Soviet
Union provided billions of dollars in subsidies to Cuba as a way to avoid the weight of economic
sanctions imposed by the US—but they also fail in bringing about substantive policy changes in
undemocratic states.50
The arguments against sanctions, while highlighting the low rate of goals achievement,
have historically centered around the adverse consequences often detrimental to the civilian
populations of undemocratic target states. An often used example of the detrimental
humanitarian consequences of sanctioning undemocratic regimes is the sanctions regime
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imposed against Iraq throughout the 1990s that lead to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of
civilians.51 According to scholars of humanitarian implications of foreign policy such as Weiss,
Cortright, Lopez, and Minear, sanctions not only frequently fail to achieve their goals, but the
inconsistent implementation of different sanctions regimes coupled with the consistent
observation of adverse consequences supported an argument against the continued use of
sanctions against undemocratic regimes. These scholars argue against the use of all economic
sanctions—comprehensive or targeted—based on the assertion that all types of sanctions can
lead to leakages that lessen the economic impact on a targeted regime and shift it to innocent
parties.52 Gordon not only flagged this impact on civilian populations of undemocratic regimes
caught up in the weight of economic sanctions targeted at their leaders as a reason for their
failure, but dubbed it as its own form of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).53
The withholding of necessary food and medicine from civilian populations as well as the
freezing of imports of tools and parts necessary to fix the civilian infrastructures often crumbling
in undemocratic states drive these assertions about the immorality and ineffectiveness of
sanctions in undemocratic states. Even as internationally supported sanctions are seen as
legitimate policy decisions by Gordon, she claims that sanctions—especially smart sanctions
targeting specific individuals—are often politicized and arbitrary.54 This unintended targeting
and sanctioning of civilians uninvolved with an authoritarian regime is used by Peksen to argue
that the net benefit of sanctions for the broader international community—including the target
regime, the sender state(s), and the civilians involved—is negative, leading him to argue that
51
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they are immoral.55 He does not immediately reject such immoral policies as a foreign policy
tool, however; this rejection comes in his assessment that sanctions have a poor track record of
success and fail to induce any political change in one-party states.56

Chapter Three: Methods and Variables
My central argument in this thesis—similar to many other academic writings regarding
international politics—is that a state’s relative power defines its ability to not only garner support
for its foreign policies but also to succeed in bringing about the desired outcome of these
policies. Because of this central argument, both state power and sanctions regimes’ successes are
key variables, independent and dependent variables respectively. Although the details of my
argument are specific to both sanctioning autocrats as well as the shifting geopolitics following
the conclusion of the Cold War, both of these key variables have been defined previously by
scholars who related this argument to different aspects of international relations. As has been
mentioned briefly above, however, there are many variations in scholarly definitions of both
power and sanctions’ success, so both variables will be defined here in greater detail and with
precision.
The independent variable here is the relative power of the states involved in any specific
case analyzed below. As stated above, I define power in relational terms, as the ability of a state
to influence the behavior of another so as to achieve the powerful actor’s desired outcome. As
power is defined as a means used when achieving an end—not the end itself—it cannot be
measured through outcomes alone. Qualitatively, power is measured through the ability of one
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state to influence another to take actions it would not have taken otherwise. Quantitatively,
power is measured here through economic, population, and military data, examples of which can
be seen in Tables One and Two above.
The dependent variable, hypothesized here to have a positive relationship with the
independent variable, is the success of sanctions. As was alluded to in the discussion of the
sanctions debate in Chapter One, different scholars define a successful sanctions regime
differently: some view any step toward political change within the target state as a success while
others will not describe anything short of a full completion of the goal as a success. In an effort
to account for the grey areas between no progress being made and the adoption of all desired
policy chances, the dependent variable is a continuous variable, with Success Scores awarded
between zero and nine. The scoring system used here is a two-part system with the final score,
the Success Score, representing the sum of the two partial scores, and is inspired by the method
laid out by the Peterson Institute for International Economics and used by Hufbauer et al. in
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered.57 The first criterion against which the cases laid out below
will be scored is the outcome of the sanctions. This first section of scoring, the Results Score,
Table Three: Possible Scores Awarded for Sanctions Regimes’ Results
Score

Level of Success

0

No observable political changes were made within the target state

1

It is unclear if aspects of the stated goals of the sanctions regime were achieved, but
some positive outcomes were observable

2

The sender state’s goals were achieved in part or in full in an excess of ten years

3

The sender state’s goals were achieved in full
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offers four available scores from zero to three. The progress achieved—if any—within the target
state necessary to be awarded each score is defined here in Table Three.
Taking into account the fact that sanctions are not always imposed alone, and other
policies are also often used to pressure adversarial regimes, the second component of the Success
Score, the Contribution Score, takes into consideration the role that sanctions played in the
overall pressure campaign against an adversarial regime. This Contribution Score also offers four
available scores between zero and three, and the available Contribution Scores are defined below
in Table Four.
Table Four: Possible Scores Awarded for Sanctions Regimes’ Contribution
Score

Relative Contribution

0

The sanctions regime made a negative contribution to the outcome of the pressure
campaign

1

The sanctions regime contributed only in a small part to the overall outcome

2

The sanctions regime contributed substantially to the pressure campaign

3

The sanctions regime contributed decisively or in full to the outcome of the pressure
campaign
The Results Score and the Contribution Score are multiplied together to create the total

Success Score, according to which the overall success of an analyzed sanctions regime is judged.
Success scores of zero and one are considered failures; scores between two and four are
considered moderate successes, and scores of six and nine are considered successes.

Chapter Four: Case Selection
I selected cases of sanctions regimes to analyze so as to minimize and eliminate potential
intervening variables introduced by variations in geographic and cultural contexts between cases.
In his discussion of the obstacles toward a general science of political action and comparative
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politics, MacIntyre stresses the disruptive nature of any intervening variables when attempting to
adopt a theory of political action.58 Political institutions and actions are affected greatly by the
environment in which they operate or are conducted, so, MacIntyre argues, a common theory
regarding political institutions or actions cannot be divorced from this environment. In
recognizing the narrow scope of my thesis and this inability to remove political events from the
context in which they occur, I have chosen to limit the external variables affecting my cases as
much as possible by focusing on one region. The time periods in which the sanctions regimes
analyzed below were imposed reflect my focus on the shifting international power dynamics
following the end of the Cold War. An initial set of sanctions imposed during the time of US
hegemony was thus chosen as well as a second set of cases either imposed during or after the rise
of smaller powers and the switch back to a multipolar world. As these time periods were set by
the question and hypothesis at hand, I then focused on selecting a region in which these sanctions
were imposed in order to minimize context-related factors.
The Middle East and North Africa has long suffered from having lucrative resources and
a strategic location, and states outside of the region have long attempted to exploit the region for
their own strategic interests. A history of states exerting their own power over MENA has led to
an unstable region and many strongmen leaders initially backed by external patron states. The
history of colonialism has also left MENA with artificially drawn borders that leave many
populations unrepresented by their governments and, therefore, resentful. These histories have
led to not only an unstable region but also one that is constantly being watched and critiqued by
outside powers. Sanctions have been one way in which outside actors have expressed their
discontent with certain MENA states’ actions. It is for this long history of external influence and
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the fact that MENA is such a target for sanctions that the cases in this thesis are limited to the
region and its immediate neighbors.
An analysis of cases occurring around the globe would inherently include a great deal of
variance and therefore an increased number of variables that would have to be accounted for.
Restricting my geographic focus allows me to avoid the increased number of variables that
comes with an analysis of cases around the globe. The US has imposed economic sanctions on
authoritarian regimes around the world, but its history of political influence and pressure has
differed widely throughout different regions. For instance, while the US began its campaign of
influence in MENA for economic reasons and access to resources, its influence in South
America under the Monroe Doctrine started as an attempt to maintain its sphere of influence in
its “backyard.” The different histories that brought the US to criticize regimes throughout the
world and attempt to influence their actions through sanctions greatly affect the sanctions
regimes themselves, as different policies such as the Monroe Doctrine introduced variables to
cases of sanctions in South America not present in other regions of the world. Focusing on a
single region allows me to eliminate variance in the factors that bring about US sanctions
regimes.
Unlike other regions of the world, American sanctions in MENA are driven openly and
before all else by economic. The US relies on and supports wealthy MENA states in an attempt
to maintain order in the region as well as oil production, whereas US influence in South America
is largely ideologically driven. For example, Cuba has faced a US embargo and sanctions for
decades due to its authoritarian government and support for other dictatorships around the
world.59 Government officials in Nicaragua have been sanctioned by the US since protests and
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harsh crackdowns began in 2018,60 and the same sanctioning of government officials has
occurred in Venezuela for over a decade in response to the Maduro regime’s authoritarian
leadership.61 These cases of sanctions were influenced by variables not only different from one
another but largely different from variables affecting, for example, the sanctions on Iraq for its
invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
While there have been many cases of sanctions regimes throughout the region overtime,
these are often limited to a small number of states that are not close allies of the US. Due to the
presence of states in MENA to which the US feels too close to sanction, the number of available
cases to analyze here is limited to a few states over two time periods. The following chapters will
analyze these cases individually, beginning with those cases of sanctions imposed during the
time of US hegemony. This initial group of cases includes sanctions against Pakistan between
1991 and 2001, Iraq between 1991 and 2003, and Libya between 1992 and 2003. Analysis of
sanctions regimes in MENA will continue to those imposed after the global switch back to
multipolarity. This grouping of cases includes Syria between 2004 and September 2019, Sudan
between 1997 and 2017, and Iran between 1984 and 2015.

Chapter Five: Pakistan
The Case for Sanctions against Pakistan
As the Cold War went on in the 1980s and the Soviet Union solidified its occupation of
Afghanistan, the US began to view Pakistan as a possible pillar of democracy and capitalism in
the region.62 With the Soviets in Afghanistan since 1979, India’s policy of non-alignment, and
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the toppling of the pro-Western Iranian Shah, the US was left to look toward Pakistan as a tool
for containing communism in the region. US assistance was used throughout the 1980s to
modernize Pakistan’s military capabilities and Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency, and both
the Pakistani military and ISI supported the anti-Soviet campaign within Afghanistan.63 In 1985,
the Pressler Amendment (Section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) was passed,
making clear the important position the US believed that Pakistan occupied. US military and
economic aid were defined in this amendment as a way to protect the Pakistani people and
support economic development. As aid was intended for the promotion of peace and democracy
alone, Section 620E(e) added the caveat that US aid to Pakistan can only be permitted if it can be
determined that “Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed
United States military assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will
possess a nuclear explosive device.”64
By 1990, President George H. W. Bush could no longer certify that Pakistan was a nonnuclear state, so aid was no longer permitted. The discovery of Pakistan’s nuclear program
coincides, however, with the weakening of the Soviet Union and the removal of Soviet troops
from neighboring Afghanistan. The US, while it continued to promote the spread of democracy
globally, no longer had a perceived dire need to maintain a strategic and ideological alliance with
Pakistan as a buffer state against the Soviets in Afghanistan. As a result, the US was able to
recognize the issues it had with Pakistan since the state’s birth, including Pakistan’s border
clashes with India and the government’s growing nuclear ambitions. It was these nuclear
ambitions and the subsequent testing of nuclear devices outside of the purview of International
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Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines that justified the imposition of a US sanctions regime
against the government of Pakistan between 1990 and 2001.
Sanctions against Pakistan
In compliance with Section 602E(e) of the Pressler Amendment, military and economic
aid valued at $564 million slated for fiscal year 1991 was blocked on October 1, 1990. The
planned delivery of military equipment to Pakistan was also halted, including the sale of 71 F16A fighter jets, and joint military exercises between the two states were halted.65 The newly
free Pakistani press responded to the sanctions with anger, denouncing the US sanctions as antiIslamic, unfair, and discriminatory. By 1992, however, Sharyar Khan, Pakistan’s foreign
minister, admitted to the Washington Post that the country possessed the components and knowhow necessary to build at least one nuclear device. This admission was supported by US Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports to Congress and it was later determined that China had broken
a verbal agreement with officials of the US government and delivered 24 M-11 ballistic missiles
with a range of 18 miles and a payload of over 1,700 pounds to Pakistan.66
Sanctions escalated in 1998 following six nuclear test explosions on May 27, five on May
28, and one on May 30.67 The Glenn Amendment (Section 102(b)(B)(ii) of the Arms Export
Control Act of 1994) was enforced, mandating the imposition of sanctions on any state that
detonates an explosive nuclear device without prior adherence to IAEA regulations and
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recognition by the agency as a nuclear state.68 These sanctions prohibited all exports to Pakistan
of specific goods and technology with civilian and military nuclear applications. Although the
government of Pakistan did not stop its nuclear ambitions in the face of escalating economic
sanctions, and public opinion in Pakistan remained critical of the US, the Pakistani regime did
not modify its foreign and security policies significantly throughout the 1990s.69 The Pakistani
government did change its policies in 1999, however, when the state’s army ousted the
democratically elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on October 13 of that year.70
This military coup triggered Section 508 of the Foreign Operations, Export, Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act 2000 which prohibits all aid and credit from the US to any
state whose duly elected government is deposed in such a coup.71
Removal of US Sanctions
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the US looked again to Pakistan as a strategic
ally neighboring Afghanistan. On September 22, 2001, the Pressler and Glenn Amendments
were waived by the George W. Bush Administration, and on October 17 the military couprelated sanctions were also waived.72 At the time of these waivers, the government of Pakistan
was facing a $32 billion external debt, using close to 60% of its annual revenue to service these
debts. The newly reopened US military and economic assistance came at a time when the US
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needed a stable Pakistani government able to aid the US in its fight against the Taliban in
Afghanistan.
Although Pakistan was a useful ally in the first years of America’s war on terror, the
Pakistani government never slowed its nuclear ambitions. According to the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, as of 2019 Pakistan possesses between 150 and 160
nuclear weapons and produces enough highly enriched uranium annually to supply 10 to 15 new
warheads per year. Despite this large stockpile, Pakistan is party to neither the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nor the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The
continuing nuclear ambitions of Pakistan constitute a failure of the US sanctions regime imposed
against Pakistan.
Success Score: Zero
Due to the failure of the Pakistani sanctions regime to bring about the intended end of
Pakistan’s nuclear program as well as the sanction regime’s sole contribution to the US pressure
campaign against Pakistan, the Success Score of this sanctions regime is zero. This score can be
broken down into a Results Score of zero and a Contribution Score of three. The Results Score of
zero is due to the complete failure of the US sanctions regime in Pakistan to stymie the state’s
nuclear ambitions. Even with the sanctions regime’s focus on nuclear weapons, the Pakistani
government was still led by a military government that came to power in the 1999 coup at the
time of the sanctions’ removal. The Contribution Score of three is due to the presence of
sanctions alone in the US pressure campaign against Pakistan and its nuclear ambitions. This
focus on the dismemberment of Pakistan’s nuclear program coupled with the failure of the
sanctions regime to bring about this dismemberment and a return to democracy in Pakistan result
in a total Success Score of zero, amounting to a failure of the US sanctions regime in Pakistan.
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Chapter Six: Iraq
The Case for Sanctions against Iraq
On August 2, 1990, in violation of Chapter 1, Article 2.4 of the UN Charter, the Iraqi
military invaded neighboring Kuwait. By early afternoon, Iraq’s Republican Guard had captured
important government buildings in Kuwait City, raided the royal family’s palace, and killed the
brother of the emir. In the days following the August 2 invasion, Kuwaiti forces were
outmatched, and Iraqi forces had pushed south to capture key Kuwaiti ports.73 The UN Security
Council responded to the invasion immediately with a formal condemnation of Iraq—the passage
of which was encouraged by US representatives—in UNSC Resolution 600 on the same day.74
Along with the impositions of the sanctions regime described below the Bush
Administration also prepared for a military campaign against the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait,
later code-names Occupation Desert Shield. With approval from the Saudi crown prince,
100,000 US troops and airmen were sent to Saudi Arabia tasked with defending Kuwait by
expelling Iraqi forces and restoring Kuwaiti political sovereignty and territorial integrity. US
naval vessels stationed at Diego Garcia were also moved to the Persian Gulf off of the Kuwaiti
coast. At the time, this operation accounted for the largest mobilization of US troops since the
Vietnam War.75
With pressure again from US delegates to the UN, UNSCR 678 was passed on November
29, 1990, allowing member states to use all necessary means to remove Iraqi occupying forces
from Kuwait if they had not withdrawn on their own by January 15, 1991.76 On January 16,
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1991, US forces deployed from their bases and began a bombing campaign against Iraq’s air
defense and command-and-control centers known as Operation Desert Storm. The First Gulf
War ended on February 28, 1991 after Iraqi troops had been pushed out of Kuwait’s sovereign
territory and President George H. W. Bush told the Iraqi people to act however they could,
independently from the US, to remove Saddam Hussein from power.77 This air and ground
military campaign worked alongside the imposition of sanctions against Iraq to not only restore
Kuwaiti sovereignty but also to punish the Hussein regime for its violation of international law.
Sanctions against Iraq
On August 6, 1990, UNSCR 661 reaffirmed the Security Council’s condemnation of
Saddam Hussein’s regime and added the imposition of multilateral sanctions against the regime.
All exports from Iraq—and the occupied Kuwait as an extension of the Hussein regime—were
prohibited from being accepted by member states, and nationals of all member states were also
prohibited from assisting in Iraq’s export industry, including oil exports. Along with this, all
imports and aid to Iraq and Kuwait were restricted with the exception of supplies with strictly
medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs.78 Within days of Resolution
661, 90 percent of Iraq’s imports and 97 percent of its exports were cut.79 UNSCR 706, passed
on August 15, 1991, allowed the sale of Iraqi oil through specialized UN accounts—called the
Oil For Food Program (OFFP)—on the condition that all profits from the sale of oil go to the
purchase of humanitarian goods such as medicines and food.80 It was mandated in Resolutions
661 and 706 that all sanctions on Iraqi imports and exports were to be maintained until the
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government of Iraq removed its troops from Kuwait’s sovereign territory, repatriated all of its
and Kuwait’s citizens, and paid in full the costs of the Special Commission created to monitor
the situation in Iraq as well as the IAEA’s costs for its increased monitoring of Iraq’s possible
WMD program.
The US voted in favor of these UNSC resolutions and mirrored the sanctions in
Executive Order (EO) 12722, issued on August 3, 1990. In this EO, the Bush Administration
froze all property of the government of Iraq and its officials held in or transferred through the
US.81 Throughout the 1990s, the US and its allies—most notably the United Kingdom—
continuously blocked sales of materials such as chlorine to Iraq through the OFFP by claiming
that they had potential military uses as well as humanitarian ones.82 These sanctions have
become the subject of considerable scrutiny since their removal and the publication of numerous
studies that show the humanitarian effects of their imposition, including the increase in
malnutrition and child mortality rates.
Removal of US and UN Sanctions
After thirteen years of harsh sanctions on Iraq, the US escalated its pressure campaign
against the Hussein regime with another invasion and the commencement of the Second Gulf
War in March 2003. Based on faulty intelligence connecting the government of Iraq to the alQaeda terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks and claiming that Iraq had WMD capabilities, the
US began a bombing campaign on key ministries and potential residences of Hussein in Baghdad
on March 20, 2003.83 While the war to maintain a government supported by the United States in
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Iraq and eventually against a growing insurgency continued for years—roughly 5,200 US troops
remain in Iraq as of March 202084—the US installed the Coalition Provisional Authority and
claimed victory as early as May 2003.85 With the establishment of an American-led government
in Baghdad and the eventual capture, trial, and execution of Saddam Hussein, the US and UN
reduced some sanctions to promote the Coalition Provisional Authority and Development Fund
for Iraq, a branch of the Central Bank of Iraq.
Executive Order 13303, issued on May 22, 2003, made it so that sanctions imposed by
EO 12722 no longer applied to Iraqi government institutions established by the US. As the US
had deposed the Hussein regime, sanctions previously imposed against the government of Iraq
were transferred to specific individuals formerly involved in the Hussein regime. Properties and
international transactions that could benefit the development of a new Iraqi government backed
by the US were permitted.86 UNSC Resolution 1483, passed on May 22, 2003, also transferred
the UN sanctions previously imposed on the government of Iraq to individuals who constituted
the former government.87 While sanctions against former Hussein regime officials and
individuals who were thought to pose a threat to the stability of Iraq continued to be imposed for
years, sanctions against the government of Iraq itself ended with the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s
government in 2003.
Success Score: Two
Due to the removal of Iraqi troops from Kuwaiti sovereign territory and the
commencement of two wars during the international pressure campaign against Saddam
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Hussein’s regime, the Success Score for the sanctions regime against Iraq is two. This score can
be broken down into a Results Score of two and a Contribution Score of one. The Results Score
of two accounts for the removal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait following the imposition of
sanctions and the First Gulf War as well as confirmation following the commencement of the
Second Gulf War that Iraq did not possess WMDs. As the regime targeted by sanctions was
deposed before the sanctions were removed, a success score of three cannot be awarded. It is
impossible to determine how Hussein’s regime would have responded to the sanctions regime
without an invasion.
The two invasions of Iraq, besides affecting the Results Score, also contributed to the
Contribution Score of one. Both Gulf Wars led to the removal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and
later the dissolution of the government of Iraq, but sanctions also contributed in part to the
pressure campaign against the government. Throughout the 1990s, between the two Gulf Wars,
sanctions continued to isolate the Iraqi government and build an international coalition opposed
to Saddam Hussein and his government. The Results Score of two and the Contribution Score of
one constitute a moderate success of the sanctions regime imposed against Iraq between 1990
and 2003.

Chapter Seven: Libya
The Case for Sanctions against Libya
On December 21, 1988, a bomb was detonated aboard Pan Am Flight 103 en route to
New York over Lockerbie, Scotland. Including eleven Lockerbie residents struck by debris, 270
people died in this terrorist attack, later found to have been perpetrated by Libyan intelligence
officers.88 Following a three-year investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
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and Scottish authorities, warrants for the arrests of Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi and Lamen
Khalifa Fhimah were issued in November 1991. In a similar incident, Union de Transports
Aériens (UTA) Flight 772 was brought down by a bomb over the Sahara Desert in Niger on
September 19, 1989. All 170 people on board were killed. Six Libyan nationals were later found
guilty by a French court for their involvement in the planning of this terrorist attack.89
Despite investigations into Libyan officials and nationals, the Libyan government had
neither accepted any responsibility for the attacks nor contributed to the ongoing investigations
by January 21, 1992. UNSC Resolution 731, passed on this date, formally condemned the
government of Libya for its inefficient response to the attacks and requests from member states
to cooperate in the investigations.90 Muammar Gaddafi’s regime continued throughout the 1990s
and early 2000s not to cooperate with international investigations into its citizens and grew
increasingly adversarial in the eyes of US officials. As has proven to be a recurring theme,
consecutive US administrations began to worry about Libya’s chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons capabilities. These capabilities became an additional issue of contention between the
US and an increasingly adversarial Libya.
Sanctions against Libya
In response to what was seen as the government of Libya’s assistance to terrorist
organizations, the UNSC passed resolution 748 on March 31, 1992, imposing an arms embargo
against Libya and restricting air travel from the country. Member states were asked to prohibit
the entrance of any aircraft into their territory that traveled through Libya and to prohibit the
provision of any aircraft component, arms, or advice on military matters to Libyan officials and
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nationals.91 Having made no progress on the calls to contribute to investigations and end support
for terrorist groups, the government of Libya was further sanctioned through UNSCR 883,
passed on November 11, 1993. With the exception of petroleum and agricultural sales conducted
through a designated account, all Libyan exports were blocked from global markets, and the
assets of the government of Libya and any of its officials were frozen by member states. Libyan
Arab Airlines was also singled out in Resolution 883, and all business with the airline was to be
prohibited by all member states.92
By 1996 the aforementioned concern from the US government regarding Libyan WMD
capabilities had grown considerably, and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 was passed to
address this concern. Through this act, the accusation that the Libyan government consorted with
terrorists previously made by the UNSC in Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 was reiterated. The US
president was also given authorization to sanction any individuals found to have contributed to
the ability of the Libyan government to acquire WMDs, develop its petroleum resources, or
maintain its aviation capabilities.93 The total UN and US sanctions regime imposed against Libya
amounted to the near complete isolation of Libya from global markets. All exports save for
important oil and agricultural sales were blocked by the UN and even these sales were blocked
by the US.
Removal of US and UN Sanctions
After more than a decade of harsh sanctions and near isolation, Gaddafi announced the
surrender of his WMD program on December 19, 2003, including a previously unknown
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uranium enrichment project.94 Along with this surrender, in the same announcement, the
government of Libya invited IAEA inspectors into Libya and became a party to the 1993
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on their Destruction. This appeasement to international concerns regarding Libyan
weapons capabilities followed the government’s 1999 recognition of Libyan officials’
involvement in terrorist activities. The Libyan government paid appropriate compensation to the
families of the victims of UTA Flight 772, allowed two Libyan intelligence officers to stand trial
for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, and committed to cooperate in ongoing investigations.95
By 2003, Gaddafi’s regime had also vowed to end support for violent political movements across
Africa and instead join peacekeeping missions. With these developments, UNSC Resolutions
731, 748, and 883 were repealed with the passage of Resolution 1506 on September 12, 2003.96
All US sanctions not already repealed by Resolution 1506 were repealed in full on September 20,
2004 with President Bush’s EO 13357.97
The international pressure campaign against the government of Libya between 1992 and
2003 was largely focused on the sanctions regimes imposed by the UN and US. Diplomatic
relationships were, however, also severed with the Libyan Government by the United States and
a number of Asian and European states. These contentious relationships between Libya and
governments around the world eased with the removal of sanctions, especially as states engaged
in the US-led global War on Terror began to see Libya as an “important partner”—a phrase used
in 2005 by Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Chairman Richard Lugar.98 Once
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international economic engagement with Libya was normalized in the years following the
removal of sanctions, the pressure campaign imposed against the Gaddafi regime—a regime still
at the time seen by many observers as undemocratic and adversarial—ceased.
Success Score: Four
Due to the eventual acquiescence of the Libyan government to the demands of the
senders of sanctions as well as the presence of diplomatic pressures in the overall pressure
campaign against the Gaddafi regime between 1992 and 2003, the Success Score for the
sanctions regime against Libya is four. This score can be broken down into a Results Score of
two and a Contribution Score of two. The Results Score of two is due in part to the outcomes of
the sanctions regime and in part to the time it took to achieve these outcomes. While the
government of Libya abandoned its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons ambitions,
accepted responsibility for the terrorist actions of its officials, and stopped its support for violent
political movements across Africa by 2003, it took over a decade for the demands of sanctions
senders to be achieved in full. Throughout the years between 1992 and 2003, the government of
Libya escalated its support for violent actions in other states and actively worked against the
investigations of its officials. While the outcomes were eventually in favor of senders’ demands,
the time that it took for pressure on Libya to bring about these outcomes negatively affects the
Results Score.
The Contribution Score of two is due to the presence of diplomatic sanctions as well as
economic sanctions. The sanctions regime that largely contributed to the outcomes described
above was also not the only aspect of the pressure campaign against the Gaddafi regime. Along
with economic isolation from the global economy, the Libyan government was also cut off
diplomatically, meaning that the sanctions regime contributed significantly rather than in full.
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The overall Success Score of four constitutes a moderate success of the sanctions regime against
Libya.

Chapter Eight: Syria
The Case for Sanctions against Syria
As the United States worked to stabilize the newly installed government in Iraq and
solidify its control over the state, it began to extend its influence beyond Iraq’s borders in 2004.
On May 11, 2004, President George W. Bush issued EO 13338, which stated that the
government of Syria sponsored terrorism, illegally occupied sections of Lebanon’s sovereign
territory, pursued WMDs, and worked to undermine the stability of the US backed government
in Iraq.99 For just over seven years, the US maintained the position set forth in EO 13338 that the
Syrian government was a sponsor of terrorism and instability in the region and was illegally
pursuing WMDs. This position was changed in 2011 only to add to the severity of the US stance
vis-a-vis Syria and acknowledge the state’s abysmal human rights record.100 This was a drastic
change from US policy regarding Syria prior to 2004. In the years leading up to President Bush’s
May 2004 Executive Order, the US saw Syria—along with Egypt and Saudi Arabia—as an
important actor in the region, one instrumental to any Middle East peace process that could not
be sanctioned as severely as other states in the region.101 The Assad regime in Damascus,
especially under the control of Hafez al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad’s father, was seen by the US as a
key negotiator in any peace agreement between Arab states and Israel. Hafez al-Assad was the
first president to maintain control of Syria for an extended period of time after a long line of
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short-lived leaders and repeated coups. He was seen as stabilizing an important regional broker
state crucial to the US and its interests in MENA.102
The events of the Arab Spring in 2011 brought about even more changes to US policy
regarding Syria. In response to peaceful protests throughout Syria and MENA calling for
liberalization, the government of Syria used arbitrary arrests and torture against the protesters in
an effort to stop them. The human rights abuses experienced throughout Syria were well
documented, and President Barack Obama responded by extending the sanctions originally
imposed in EO 13338 through further executive orders. US State Department officials went as
far as saying in 2011, in response Syria’s growing disregard for international condemnation, that
President Assad had to make the choice either to lead a “transition to democracy, or to leave.”
Note, however, that President Obama’s additions to the sanctions regime against Syria did not
explicitly state that regime change was a goal of the US Administration. Rather, they called for
the cessation of human rights abuses, destabilizing actions, and WMD programs.
Sanctions against Syria
From the initial declaration in 2004 of Syria as a sponsor of terrorism and instability in
Iraq and as a state with unmonitored WMD ambitions, the US restricted imports to and exports
from Syria. With the exception of food and medicine, the second Bush administration restricted
all imports to Syria of any item illustrated in the US Munitions List (22 C.F.R. Part 121)—
including any guns, armaments, ammunition, and explosive materials103—and the Commerce
Control List (15 C.F.R. Part 774)—including any items that can be used in nuclear energy or
weapons programs, covert and overt military actions, or materials needed for torture or
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executions.104 Pursuant to EO 13338, only the US Departments of State and Commerce are able
to authorize exports to or imports from Syria. All other exports from US government agencies,
persons, or businesses were restricted. Additionally, this executive order also blocked the assets
of any person found to have assisted the government of Syria in providing safe haven to
sanctioned terrorist organizations, its pursuit of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and
its destabilizing activities in Iraq.105
The list of these sanctioned individuals found to have assisted the government of Syria in
its actions perceived to be hostile to US interests in MENA was expanded in 2011. Following the
breakout of the Arab Spring, the US increased its pressure campaign against Syria to include
actions against the country’s human rights abuses. With President Obama’s of EO 13572 issued
on April 29, 2011, sanctions against the Assad regime in Damascus were expanded to include the
freezing of assets held by any individual assisting the government of Syria in its arbitrary arrests
and torture of peaceful protesters.106 Merely 19 days later, on May 18, 2011, President Obama
imposed sweeping sanctions across the entire Syrian government when he issued EO 13573. This
executive order as well as EO 13582, issued on August 17, 2011, finalized the sanctions regime
against Syria to include the freezing of all assets held by any Syrian government official or
individual found to have aided the government of Syria, the restriction of all imports to and
exports from Syria—with the exception of food and medicine—and the prohibition of any new
investments made within Syria by US citizens or businesses.107 This latest imposition of
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sanctions against the Assad regime included an explicit mention of the blocking of the sale of
Syrian petroleum products to any citizen or agency of the US.
The European Union mirrored these sanctions against the Syrian Government and its
officials in May 2011. Like the sanctions regime imposed by the US, the EU sanctions also
include the freezing of assets held by any official of the Syrian government and an embargo on
the sales of arms and any equipment that may be used for repression of civilians.108 Although
Chinese and Russian vetoes have ensured that the UN Security Council not passed a resolution
sanctioning the government of Syria, the 28 member states of the EU as well as Japan, Canada,
Australia, Switzerland, Norway, and Turkey have all imposed unilateral sanctions against Syrian
government officials and entities.109 The Arab League, with 22 members, also imposed sanctions
against the Assad regime in November 2011, but there has been limited enforcement of these
economic restrictions.110
Continuation of Sanctions against Syria
Because sanctions continue to restrict economic activity with Syria at the time of this
writing, my analysis of these sanctions ends at the start of this thesis: September 2019. As
sanctions regimes carried on leading up to September 2019, countries with close ties to Syria
continued to “bust” the sanctions imposed by 57 states. A global turn against Syria in 2011
presented Russia with an opportunity to extend its influence where others would not. Russia had
been attempting to reclaim its position as a global power since the early 2000s, so this
opportunity was attractive to the Russian government. Since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War
in 2011 and the subsequent insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns in the country, Russia
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has presented itself as a patron of the Assad regime and one of the very few international allies of
the regime. As a sponsor of the Syrian government’s campaign against its own citizens, Russia is
not only providing aid to Syria, but it also views its influence in Syria as a potential first step
toward regaining the global statues it badly desires. It is a quid-pro-quo; the government of Syria
gains access to Russian weaponry while Russia gains the ability to project its effectiveness in
Syria beyond the country itself and even beyond MENA as a whole.111
Although Russia’s patronage in Syria does not directly violate international sanctions, the
sale of weapons to the country as well as the purchasing of Syrian oil deliberately circumvent
these sanctions. There are specific individuals and businesses that evade US sanctions against
Syria. These individuals and entities were themselves sanctioned in EO 13608, “Prohibiting
Certain Transactions With and Suspending Entry Into the United States of Foreign Sanctions
Evaders With Respect to Iran and Syria,” issued on May 1, 2012.112 This executive order
empowered the US Treasury Department to identify any person or entity involved in sanctionsbusting activities, restrict their entrance into the US, revoke any US aid provided to them, and
prohibit their ability to do business with any US firms, citizens, or government agencies.113
Since sanctions against the government of Syria have yet to be removed at the time of
this writing, only an analysis of the continuing effects of sanctions can be conducted. The Assad
regime continues its campaigns against Syrian civilians in an effort to reclaim control throughout
its sovereign territory, being accused multiple times in the past three years alone of the use of
chemical weapons against citizens within its own borders.114 Through these acts, the Syrian
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government violated both international law and multiple international sanctions regimes imposed
against it by not only using chemical weapons of mass destruction but also targeting civilians in
an illegal act of collective punishment.
Success Score: Zero
Due to the ongoing human rights abuses, support for non-state militias targeting civilians,
and influence over hostile groups and governments in Iraq and Lebanon, the success score for
sanctions against Syria is zero. This total success score can be broken down into a Results Score
of zero and a Contribution Score of two. The Results Score of zero is attributed first and
foremost to the continued presence of human rights abuses throughout Syria as well as to the
influence that the Assad regime continues to exert over destabilizing forces in Iraq and Lebanon.
In 2007, three years after the initial imposition of sanctions against Syria, Iraqi reports alleged
that 50 percent of terrorists within the country entered from Syria. In 2009, Iraq again accused
the Syrian government of conspiring with Islamic terrorists in the country to conduct bombings
in Baghdad.115 Today, with a Shia government in Baghdad and powerful Shia militias controlling
segments of Lebanese politics, the Assad regime continues to extend its influence beyond its
borders, an action that led to the initial imposition of sanctions against the Assad regime in 2004.
In the 2011 vote that suspended Syria’s participation in the Arab League, only Lebanon and
Yemen abstained, and Iraq voted against the suspension while all other member states voted to
condemn the state.116
The Contribution Score of two is due to the prominence of the economic sanctions
discussed throughout this section in the overall pressure campaign against the Assad regime.
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While the US began a military campaign against the Islamic State in Syria in 2014 with airstrikes
and support for the Iraqi security forces and Syrian Kurdish Peshmerga on the ground, this fight
that the US entered was strictly against the Islamic State rather than the Syrian government.117
President Obama explicitly chose not to conduct military strikes against the Assad regime in
2013 when it used chemical weapons against its citizens despite an early pronouncement that
such weapons crossed a “red line.”118 Instead of direct military responses, sanctions and support
for anti-Assad forces were tools used in 2004 and 2011 to combat belligerent actions taken by
the Syrian government. Military action in yet another MENA state is not easily supported by the
US public, but economic restrictions and support for proxies often are, and that is what happened
in Syria. With the Results Score of zero and the Contribution Score of two, this overall Success
Score of zero constitutes a failure of the US sanctions regime against Syria.

Chapter Nine: Sudan
The Case for Sanctions against Sudan
On June 25, 1995, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, eleven men attempted to assassinate
Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. Three of these men fled to neighboring Sudan after the
unsuccessful attempt, and the Sudanese government failed to surrender the men for extradition to
Ethiopia once it was revealed that they were hiding out in the country. This harboring of the
three suspects came after years of concerns within the international community regarding the
government of Sudan’s support for international terrorism, especially following the 1989 coup
that brought to power an Islamist-oriented military government led by Umar al-Bashir, and the
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1993 invitation from Bashir’s advisor Hassan al-Turabi to Osama bin Laden to seek refuge in
Sudan.119 With this invitation, Sudan was placed on the US government’s list of state supporters
of terrorism.120 By April 26, 1996, UNSC Resolution 1054 was passed at the urging of the
Ethiopian, Egyptian, and US governments, requiring all UN member states to significantly limit
the Sudanese diplomatic missions within their territories and restrict to the greatest extent
possible the movement of Sudanese government officials and armed forces through their
territories. These diplomatic sanctions were to remain in place until the Security Council was
satisfied that the government of Sudan ceased supporting and providing shelter to terrorists.121
The US began its economic sanctions against the government of Sudan in November of
1997 when, despite Sudan’s expulsion of bin Laden in 1996, it was determined that Sudan was
not curtailing its actions related to terrorism and that human rights violations in the country
persisted.122 Executive order 13067, issued by President Bill Clinton on November 3, 1997,
called for economic sanctions against the government of Sudan in response to the government’s
alleged human rights abuses. These alleged abuses included slavery and the denial of religious
freedoms. Along with these abuses and Sudan’s ongoing support for terrorism, the state was also
accused by the US of working to destabilize neighboring governments.123
Critiques of the Sudanese government escalated in 2005 in response to the genocide in
the Darfur region of Sudan perpetrated by the government of Sudan and its Janjaweed militia.
The genocide began in early 2003 with what was portrayed as a counter-insurgency campaign
against rebel groups in the region. Through targeted attacks on farms, villages, and towns in
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Darfur as well as through forced displacements, starvation, thirst, and disease, an estimated
450,000 civilians died.124 The UNSC responded with a formal condemnation of the al-Bashir
regime’s actions in Darfur and escalation of economic sanctions against the regime.
Sanctions against Sudan
The aforementioned 1997 EO 13067, Blocking Sudanese Government Property and
Prohibiting Transactions with Sudan, in condemning the government of Sudan for its
destabilizing activities in neighboring states, support for terrorism, and human rights abuses,
imposed economic sanctions against the al-Bashir regime. Through this executive order, all
assets of the Sudanese government held in the US or by US residents and businesses abroad were
blocked. Other than informational materials and materials intended to mitigate human suffering,
all imports to and exports from Sudan were restricted, and all US residents and businesses were
prohibited from providing the government of Sudan with credit, loans, technology, or any
technological assistance.125 These initial economic sanctions, imposed in 1997 by the Clinton
Administration, amounted to a near complete expulsion of Sudan from US trade, limiting any
trade with the country to humanitarian relief packages only.
Just as the international critiques of the Sudanese government escalated following the
commencement of the genocide in Darfur, economic sanctions against the country escalated as
well. UN Security Council Resolution 1591 was passed on March 29, 2005 following seven
previous UNSC resolutions condemning the government of Sudan throughout 2004 and early
2005 for its and its proxy militias’ actions in Darfur. Resolution 1591 created a committee to
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monitor the ongoing genocide in Darfur and froze the assets of any individual—either employed
by the government of Sudan or by one its allied militias—found to have contributed to the
human rights and international law violations. All assets, funds, and economic resources held
directly or indirectly by these individuals in any member state were to be frozen by the
respective member state until the government of Sudan and its client militias ended their
campaign of human rights abuses. China and Russia were the only members of the permanent
five members of the Security Council to abstain from voting on this resolution.126
Along with voting in favor of Resolution 1591, the United States reiterated its
condemnation of Sudan and mirrored the sanctions in EO 13400 after more than a year of
Sudan’s non-compliance. This executive order, issued on April 26, 2006, froze the assets of any
individual found to have provided arms, military equipment, or assistance in military planning to
the Sudanese government, Sudan Liberation Movement, Justice and Equality Movement, and/or
the Janjaweed militia.127 These bodies were found by the US government to have been complicit
in the genocide in Darfur and human rights abuses throughout the country of Sudan, so sanctions
were extended from the initial 1997 regime to include not only government officials but any
individual found to have assisted such officials or worked on their behalf.
Removal of US and UN Sanctions
Shortly after the imposition of the US sanctions regime in Sudan, the list of sanctioned
individuals came under scrutiny by those monitoring the situation in Darfur. The list of those
individuals sanctioned by the US did not include three high-ranking Sudanese government
officials that led the state’s defense forces and interior, reflecting a lack of diplomatic will to
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punish those directly responsible for the genocide in Darfur.128 Despite the absence of these three
top-ranking men from the US sanctions list, the government of Sudan agreed to comply with the
United States’ conditions in January 2017, and the economic sanctions were removed. The
sanctions imposed by the UNSC in Resolution 1591, unlike the US sanctions regime, remain in
place at the time of writing, however, but only four men remain on the list of sanctioned
individuals, and all remaining sanctions apply only to non-governmental groups and militias.129
Beginning in July 2016, the government of Sudan initiated certain positive actions that
led to the repeal of the sanctions regime imposed against Sudan. The Obama administration
credited the al-Bashir regime with a marked reduction in offensive military action and with
taking steps to improve humanitarian conditions throughout the state. The government of Sudan
made a formal pledge to the US government to cease hostilities in Sudan’s conflict areas, and it
cooperated with the Obama administration in addressing regional conflicts as well as terrorism.
These actions led to the formal removal of economic sanctions against the Sudanese government
by the US through Executive Order 13761, issued on January 13, 2017.130 This final removal of
sanctions against Sudan came six years after the independence of South Sudan in 2011, which
was also coupled with the removal of import and export restrictions within that territory.
The international pressure campaign against Sudan for its actions in Darfur, along with
being comprised of economic and diplomatic sanctions, included UNAMID, the African UnionUN hybrid operation in Darfur, which was authorized under UNSC Resolution 1769 on July 31,
2007. This UN peacekeeping mission was largely performed by African Union (AU) troops as
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well as troops and experts from Asian states; the US and its NATO allies were not involved. This
peacekeeping mission was tasked with the provision of humanitarian assistance and enforcement
of a 2011 peace agreement between involved parties.131 The pressure campaign also involved the
first warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the arrest of Umar al-Bashir.
Despite the UN peacekeeping mission and arrest warrant, however, average Sudanese citizens—
most notably Darfurians—remain insecure, with millions living in squalid camps.132
Additionally, although Umar al-Bashir was ousted in April 2019, protests against the successor
military government resulted in even more human rights abuses, including the killing of peaceful
protesters.133
Success Score: Two
Due to the recent human rights abuses in response to protests in Sudan and near full
contribution of the US and UN sanctions regimes to the overall pressure campaign against the
Sudanese government the Success Score for these sanctions is two. This overall score can be
broken down into a Results Score of one and a Contribution Score of two. Although the alBashir regime made formal concessions to the Obama administration in the first weeks of 2017,
this government and its successor continued its patronage of non-governmental militias—most
notoriously the Janjaweed—that committed crimes against humanity in Sudan. These continued
human rights abuses conducted by representatives of the government of Sudan and the
government itself account for the Results Score of one. While some steps were taken toward the
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fulfillment of the conditions for the removal of the sanctions regimes, these have proven to only
be nominal advancements.
The Contribution Score of two can be attributed to the prevalence of sanctions in the
overall pressure campaign against the Sudanese government. Especially in regard to the US,
sanctions were the only tool used against Sudan’s human rights abuses and support for terrorism.
As has been discussed above, the UN also authorized a Chapter VII peacekeeping mission in
Darfur. As it is ultimately US sanctions that are at issue here, a Contribution Score of two was
awarded to the sanctions regime in Sudan because US actions are of my utmost concern. This
total Success Score of two constitutes a moderate success.

Chapter Ten: Iran
The Case for Sanctions against Iran
The United States has had some type of formal scrutiny against the Iranian government in
place since the Islamic Revolution in February 1979, which upended a history of cooperation
between the US and the Shah of Iran. Similar to the US relationship with the Assad regimes in
Syria prior to 2004, the US had a long-term, positive relationship with Iran that unraveled in
1979. Since the 1953 US-backed coup in Iran that brought down the Shah of Iran’s prime
minister, Iran was a client state of the US, seen to be bringing stability to MENA and balancing
against Soviet influence in the region.134 An initial set of sanctions was imposed immediately
following the Islamic Revolution and the subsequent seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, but
these sanctions were removed on January 20, 1981 following the Algiers Accord that provided
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for the release of the US hostages.135 By 1984, however, sanctions were back in place against the
government of Iran following the declaration by the Reagan administration that Iran was a
sponsor of terrorism in response to the Hezbollah suicide attack on a US Marine base in
Lebanon.136 Along with retaliating against the Khomeini regime in Tehran, the new sanctions
that came with the declaration of state sponsorship of terrorism also worked to balance Iran
against Iraq in the midst of the Iran-Iraq War. The US feared an expansionist Islamic power in
MENA and chose to favor Iraq in the war as the lesser of the two evils.
Sanctions against Iran escalated even further in 1987 near the end of the Iran-Iraq War
with the designation of Iran as a major narcotics trafficker.137 With this intensification in the
allegations made by the US against Iran regarding its illicit activities, the US also increased its
efforts to induce third-party states and foreign entities to comply with its sanctions regime.
Efforts to increase the number of states and entities supporting the unilateral sanctions imposed
by the US were driven by domestic constituencies in the US that viewed Iran as a threat to US
interests in the region as well as interests of America’s allies—notably Israel.
With changing US administrations in 1993 and 2001 and the May 22, 1997 election of
the seemingly moderate Mohammed Khatemi as president of Iran came wavering commitments
to America’s long-term sanctions against Iran. But sanctions persisted, nonetheless. While the
US continued to view Iran as a destabilizing player in MENA and a sponsor of terrorism that
gravely affected the US and its allies’ interests in the region, US firms also continued to value
and desire Iranian oil exports. This desire for Iranian oil complicated the ability of US
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administrations to confidently sanction Iran, but, by August 1997, the US banned all exports to
third-party countries of products that were destined to be sold to Iran.
Sanctions against Iran
The January 19, 1984 declaration of Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism came with the
prohibition of the transactions of any goods on the US Munitions List (22 C.F.R. Part 121) with
Iran as well as the termination of the provision of any bilateral assistance to Iran from the US. As
mentioned above, these sanctions were increased four years later in 1987 with the further
declaration by the Reagan Administration that Iran was involved in narcotics-trafficking.138 With
this October 29, 1987 declaration came the further imposition of sanctions that prohibited nearly
all imports from Iran into the US through Executive Order 12613.139 This had the key exclusion,
however, of petroleum products refined from Iranian crude oil in a third country.140 US oil, gas,
and construction businesses continued through the early 1990s to profit off of Iranian crude oil,
and Iran even awarded the US firm Conoco a contract to develop its Sirri offshore oil fields in
early 1995.141
Although oil, gas, and construction companies desired the ability to maintain access to
Iranian markets, domestic constituencies that feared Iran’s close ties to terrorist groups
throughout MENA and their ability to affect US interests in the region won the debate over
Iranian sanctions. President Clinton issued two executive orders in March and May of 1995 that
sanctioned any involvement in the Iranian petroleum industry and further banned virtually all
economic transactions between US entities and Iran.142 Except for transactions of informational
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materials between the two states, all imports from and exports to Iran as well as all investment in
Iranian businesses or government agencies were prohibited under Executive Orders 12957 and
12959.143
The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of August 1996, discussed in Chapter 6, worked to solidify
the US sanctions regime imposed against Iran by placing penalties on foreign firms found to
have made an investment of $20 million or more in Iranian petroleum development.144 This
imposition of sanctions against foreign firms was done with no respect for the origin of the
sanctioned firms, bringing about protests from European states that claimed the Act violated
international trade regulations. Despite protests, however, President Clinton further restricted US
exports concerning Iran in EO 13059, issued in August 1997, by prohibiting the export of US
goods to third-party states where they were ultimately destined for Iran.145
US actions regarding Iran began to liberalize in the late 1990s when the economic impact
on US entities began to become evident. The Clinton administration issued waivers to two
companies, Total and Boeing, to participate in Iran’s oil-driven economy in 1998 and 1999
respectively, and Iran was removed from the US government’s list of narcotics-producing states
in December 1998. By April 1999, an executive order issued by President Clinton allowed for
the provision of food and medicine to Iran, Libya, and Sudan, and Secretary of State Madeline
Albright announced the lifting of US sanctions on some non-oil exports—including carpets,
caviar, and pistachios—in March of 2000.146 Despite the interest in liberalizing some relations
with Iran, sanctions against the state by the US continued through this time of light sanctions143

William Clinton, Executive Order 12957, “Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Development of
Iranian Petroleum Resources.” (March 15, 1995), and William Clinton, Executive Order 12959, “Prohibiting Certain
Transactions With Respect to Iran.” (May 6, 1995).
144
The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 2.
145
William Clinton, Executive Order 13059, “Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Iran.” (August 19,
1997).
146
O’Sullivan, 51.

57

lifting, focusing on Iran’s oil and chemical production capabilities. A discourse in the US that
painted the government of Iran as belligerent and dangerous continued throughout the 2000s as
the US government also continued to pressure third-party states and foreign businesses to
comply with the sanctions.
The sanctions regime imposed by the US government against the government of Iran
amounted to the most extensive restriction on economic activity with a specific country by the
US in recent history, and Iran’s import of goods originating in the US decreased from 21 percent
of the state’s total imports in 1978 to less than 1 percent in 2001. Iran’s exports to the US also
decreased from 19 percent of the country’s total output to less than one percent in 2001.147 The
United Nations Security Council followed the US lead in 2006 with Resolution 1737 which, in
condemning the state for its illicit nuclear ambitions and insistence that it would not stop its
nuclear program, sanctioned the transfer of any enrichment related goods to Iran from any UN
member state.148 Resolutions 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1929 (2010) grew the international
sanctions regime against Iran to include prohibitions on the sales of arms, heavy weapons and
machinery, and restrictions on certain financial transactions believed to bolster illicit trade with
the country.149 The US government continued to combat foreign entities that violated both US
and UN sanctions by sanctioning these entities themselves—including North Korean, Chinese,
Armenian, and Moldovan businesses—through the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000.150
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Removal of US and UN Sanctions
Following almost two years of negotiations, on July 14, 2015, the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed by Iran, the EU, and the Permanent Five Plus One (P5+1)—
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US comprising the P5 and Germany
accounting for the additional negotiator. This JCPOA agreement brought about concessions from
all parties; Iran agreed to a serious rollback of its nuclear program and accepted fifteen years of
IAEA inspections in exchange for sanctions relief from the other involved parties.151 The
agreement—commonly referred to as the Iran Nuclear Deal—was affirmed by the UN Security
Council in Resolution 2231 on July 20, 2015. This UNSC resolution established a joint
commission tasked with monitoring Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA and called for the IAEA
to regularly verify compliance.152 Since January 16, 2016, the day the JCPOA was implemented,
the IAEA has consistently verified the government of Iran’s compliance with the standards set
for its nuclear weapons program.153 This compliance on the part of the government of Iran was
coupled with the removal of sanctions by the other involved parties, ending the US and UN
sanctions regimes in 2016.
Following the removal of sanctions against Iran, the IAEA has continued to verify Iran’s
compliance with the conditions for the removal of sanctions. Despite this, the Trump
administration left the agreement in May 2018, claiming that it was an unfair deal that allowed
Iran to continue its destabilizing practices in MENA while requiring concessions from the other
signatories.154 All other parties, including Iran, have remained in the deal despite the US
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withdrawal, but the US has re-imposed harsh sanctions on the government of Iran.155 My
analysis of the US sanctions regime against Iran ends with the signing of the JCPOA, but these
actions taken after January 16, 2016, are important for scoring. The government of Iran
continues to sponsor destabilizing actors in MENA, including Hezbollah and Hamas in Lebanon
and Israel respectively as well as insurgent groups in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen
trained by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force.156 As the IAEA verifies
regularly, however, the government of Iran has not pursued nuclear weapons or violated
international regulations regarding WMDs.
Success Score: Three
Due to the continuation of destabilizing activity throughout MENA, the persistent
evasion of US and UN sanctions to sell oil while the sanctions were in place, and the complete
reliance on sanctions in the international pressure campaign against Iran, the Success Score for
sanctions against Iran is three. This score is broken down into a Results Score of one and a
Contribution Score of three. The JCPOA was passed without Iran having complied with the
conditions of the sanctions regime against it. Instead, the agreement was signed in the belief that,
since three decades of economic sanctions had not driven Iran to change its behavior at all,
another path needed to be taken. Although the Iranian government did not comply at all with the
conditions for the sanctions’ removal, I have still awarded the sanctions regime a Results Score
of one because of the ability of international sanctions to get Iran to the negotiating table. During
the Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979, the Khomeini regime refused to negotiate until the economic
impact of the early sanctions regime began to be felt in 1981.157 Unlike previous cases of Iran’s
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refusal to cooperate with international agencies and foreign powers, it can be inferred that the
weight of economic sanctions drove Tehran to the negotiating table.
A Contribution Score of three was awarded to the sanctions regime against Iran because
such a sanctions regime was the only tool used directly against Iran in the international campaign
to pressure Iran to change its domestic actions and its activities in MENA. Unlike the cases of
Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011, military campaigns were not instigated in Iran to bring about a
change in the regime’s behavior. The US and UN instead imposed sanctions against Iran and
only fought its proxies militarily outside of the country’s borders, including ongoing
international intervention against Iranian-backed groups in Yemen’s civil war.158 With these
proxy wars occurring only outside of Iran’s borders, the pressure campaign to induce Iran to end
its support for terrorism and pursuit of nuclear weapons included sanctions alone. With a Results
Score of one and a Contribution Score of three, the overall Success Score of three constitutes a
moderate success of the sanctions regime.

Chapter Eleven: Conclusion and Summary Analysis
In the introduction to this thesis, I hypothesized that, while sanctioning autocrats has
never been perfectly effective, the end of unipolarity further solidified the inability of the US to
successfully bring about political changes in undemocratic states through economic sanctions
alone. I hypothesized that an analysis of case studies before and after the growth of less powerful
states would reveal that these states not only opposed but actively worked against US sanctions
regimes. This assertion supports existing literature arguing that sanctioning undemocratic actors
is ineffective. While the body of this thesis has not borne out this hypothesis in full, my analysis
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of six case studies demonstrates the effect of decreased US relative power on the ability of the
US to compel states to both impose and comply with economic sanctions.
Table Five: Summary of Cases and Scores
Target
Start
End
Sender(s) of Reason for
Sanctions
State
Date
Date
Sanctions
Regime

Results Contribution Success
Score
Score
Score

Pakistan Oct.
1990

Oct.
2001

Unilateral:
US

Illicit nuclear
programs and
testing and a
military coup

0

3

0

Iraq

Aug.
1990

May
2003

Multilateral:
UN

Invasion of
Kuwait and
illicit WMD
ambitions

2

1

2

Libya

March Sept.
1992
2003

Multilateral:
UN and US
(1996)

Support for
terrorism, and
illicit WMD
ambitions

2

2

4

Syria

May
2004

Ongoing
as of
April
2020

Multilateral:
US joined
by EU, Arab
League, and
six
unaffiliated
states in
2011

Support for
terrorism,
illicit WMD
ambitions,
destabilizing
actions in
MENA, and
human rights
abuses

0

2

0

Sudan

Nov.
1997

Jan.
2017

Multilateral:
US and UN
(2005)

Support for
terrorism,
human rights
abuses, and
genocide

1

2

2

Iran

Jan.
1984

Jan.
2016

Multilateral:
US and UN
(2006)

Support for
terrorism,
illicit nuclear
ambitions,
and
destabilizing
actions in
MENA

1

3

3
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The six cases discussed above demonstrate that effect of Russian, Chinese, and smaller
states’ growth on the ability of the United States to easily achieve an international consensus
regarding its economic foreign policy. While the Success Scores laid out in Table Five do not
necessarily illustrate support for my initial hypothesis, that US economic sanctions would
become less effective after the end of US hegemony, the context in which the cases of sanctions
regimes were implemented lends credence to my hypothesis. My conclusion does not show a
binary and positive relationship between the end of US hegemony in the early 2000s and the
clear increase in the inability of the US to achieve its goals of a sanctions regime. The conclusion
instead shows a persistent difficultly in affecting the actions of undemocratic regimes in MENA
overtime no matter the scale of US power—represented by continuously low Results and
Success Scores—yet an increased complexity in the imposition of these unsuccessful sanctions
regimes. The ease with which the US commanded an international audience and enacted its
desired foreign policies throughout the 1990s was thrown aside when US hegemony experienced
during this period ended. The changing geopolitics, while not gravely affecting the success of
sanctions against belligerent regimes in MENA, fundamentally changed the conditions under
which the US has been able to act in the international arena.
During the era of US hegemony, the only score of zero was awarded to the only case of
unilateral sanctions: Pakistan. Despite their unilateral imposition, however, the economic
sanctions imposed against Pakistan by the George H. W. Bush administration in 1990 faced little
opposition from other states. China continued to sell conventional weapons to Pakistan while the
country faced economic sanctions and an arms embargo from the US, but the Chinese
government did not increase its arms sales to the country as a response to this US sanctions
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regime.159 China was growing its international economic ties throughout the early 1990s, and
selling weapons to countries unlikely to be supported by western governments was one way to
grow these economic connections as well as its domestic economy. Despite the continuing arms
sales between Pakistan and China during Pakistan’s adversarial relationship with the US, the
sanctions regime was imposed with ease by the US. Pakistan’s actions in regard to WMDs and
nuclear weapons as well as its military coup violated US trade policies, so the Bush
administration was able to trigger economic sanctions against Pakistan without having to gain
international agreement to legitimize the sanctions.
The other two case studies of sanctions regimes during the era of US hegemony were
imposed by the UN Security Council. The US lobbied for the sanctions against Iraq and Libya on
the Security Council and succeeded in gaining the necessary votes. Not only did Russia and
China not threaten to veto the US-backed resolutions, a practice the states developed later in the
1990s (leading to the stopping of UN sponsored military intervention before they were even
considered), but China and Russia both voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 661, imposing
sanctions against Iraq. China was joined by only four other states on the Security Council in
abstaining from the vote on UNSC Resolution 748 regarding Libya, and it was the only member
of the P5 to abstain from the vote.160 Once the Security Council imposed these sanctions against
the Iraqi and Libyan governments, the sanctions regimes also faced little formal opposition from
these states that would later prove to complicate US desires for sanctions. The sanctions regimes
were far from perfect, and the Success Scores awarded to them reflect that, but these
imperfections were due to the targeted regimes, not the senders of the sanctions.

159
Ian Anthony et al., “The Trade in Major Conventional Weapons,” Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute Yearbook 1991 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991): 217.
160
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 748.

64

The Iraqi Oil-For-Food Program that in 1996 permitted the sale of Iraqi oil through
specified channels as a means of funding the humanitarian costs of the first Gulf War was highly
corrupt, and Saddam Hussein earned close to $13 billion through kickbacks and smuggling.
Firms from around the world were complicit in this scheme, however, and investigations into the
corruption did not show a deliberate attempt on behalf of any particular state to delegitimize the
program and the sanctions regime that brought it about. French and Russian firms proved to be
the largest contributors to Hussein’s corruption of the program, accounting for 45% of the illicit
oil sales and kickbacks.161 These firms were not acting in such a way as to deliberately work
against the UN sanctions regime, however; they were simply corrupt themselves and further
corrupted by Hussein’s desire to subvert the sanctions against him.
Regarding the moderate success of the sanctions regime against Libya, this was largely
due to the fact that the Gaddafi regime was so resistant to change throughout the 1990s, finally
terminating its belligerent actions throughout the African continents as well as its WMD program
and protection of terrorists only after a decade of near-complete economic and diplomatic
isolation from the rest of the world. Gaddafi, like Hussein, used his autocratic policies to transfer
the weight of sanctions against his government onto his citizens, and it took much longer for him
than it would have taken a democratic leader to feel the weight of the UN pressure campaign
against him. While it did take thirteen years for the Libyan government to change its actions, this
case of sanctions is the most successful of the six and functioned the closest to how sanctions
advocates argue sanctions should work.
While the Success and Results Scores of the cases of sanctions imposed when the US was
not a global hegemon did not vary from the previous cases as much as I hypothesized they
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would, the conditions under which the sanctions regimes were imposed did change. In these
cases of sanctions, the US was only able to convince different segments of the international
community to join the sanctions regime after an average of twelve years. Additionally, unlike the
sanctions against Pakistan in 1990, important to the reasoning behind these sanctions was a fear
that target regimes would gravely shift the status quo in MENA and threaten US interests in the
region. Pakistan was no longer a necessary ally of the US when sanctions were imposed in 1990,
and the US wanted to establish credibility in its commitment to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the treaty’s maintenance of only five nuclear weapons
states.162 These reasons for imposing sanctions against the Pakistani state do not align with the
much more apocalyptic views of the target states in the second group of sanctions regimes
analyzed.
The US viewed—and largely continues to view—the Syrian, Sudanese, and Iranian
regimes as not only threats to their own citizens but also as threats to regional security. It was
this latter concern—especially in the cases of Iran and Syria—that brought about US sanctions
against these regimes. Unlike the prior decade, however, the US was not as easily able to
convince a global audience of its cause. As late as 2003, the US was able to use unfounded
claims to convince allies to start another war in Iraq, but the balancing of other states’ power
against that of the US shortly after the commencement of this war significantly limited the ability
of the US to continue gaining such international support.
The time it took for international organizations and other states to join the US in its
pressure campaigns against the Syrian, Sudanese, and Iranian governments shows how changing
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geopolitics has affected US efforts abroad. Not only was the US left to pressure belligerent
regimes alone until these regimes became so obviously threatening to regional peace and
security, but states like Russia and China have actively worked around these sanctions, buying
oil and selling arms to sanctions regimes. Russia has committed its troops and aid in support of
the Syrian regime indefinitely, and leaders from the United Arab Emirates have begun to cool
their relationship with the Assad regime and work with Russia to rebuild a stable status quo.163
China as well as other Asian and Mediterranean states have continued to defy US sanctions and
risk economic penalties to purchase Iranian oil.164 Lastly, the Sudanese government, although
Umar al-Bashir stepped down, maintains its ties to the Janjaweed militia that was complicit in
the Darfurian genocide, yet, nonetheless, the country also maintains ties to other states that had
long protected Bashir from arrest by the International Criminal Court.
Although one aspect of my initial hypothesis—that the outcomes of sanctions would be
significantly affected by the rise of Russia, China, and smaller states—was not supported by an
analysis of six cases, my analysis has shown the difficulty of near universal imposition of
sanctions. It has also shown, however, that such universal imposition is necessary for sanctions’
effects to be long-lasting. Support from the UN Security Council, as opposed to support from the
EU, Arab League, or other individual states alone, has seemingly proven to be necessary to
maintain lasting effects of sanctions regimes. No regime analyzed became a close ally of the US
after the imposition of sanctions, but the latter three regimes blatantly continued the practices
that brought about sanctions in the first place. I am arguing that this is because the international
community only stepped in when the actions of the target states became so vulgar as to mandate
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a response and because this international condemnation was limited, and active opposition to the
sanctions from Russia and China persisted. The exception to this conclusion has been the success
of the JCPOA. This is a limited exception, however, because the JCPOA dealt only with Iran’s
weapons programs, neglecting the state’s destabilizing activities throughout MENA. What the
continued verification from IAEA inspectors of Iran’s compliance with the agreement shows is
that such a large-scale threat of economic sanctions in the face of specific belligerent actions is
successful in stopping such actions. The government of Iran felt the weight of multilateral
sanctions during the decade spanning 2006 and 2016, and this history of economic isolation has
proven—at least for four years—to be enough to compel Iran to stop its weapons programs in
exchange for re-entry into the global economy.
Such near-universal imposition of sanctions was not experienced in the cases of sanctions
against Sudan and Syria, however, and it is certainly not experienced with current US unilateral
sanctions against Iran since the Trump Administration left the JCPOA. This global support—or
at least lack of opposition from Russia and China—has not been experienced since the US lost its
hegemonic position in the early 2000s. Certain international relations scholars argued that the US
hegemony of the 1990s would lead to global instability once smaller states gained enough power
to attempt to balance against the US. That seems to be the case at least in regard to US efforts to
sanction undemocratic regimes in MENA. The cases of sanctions have not become significantly
less effective, but the process through which they are imposed and the lasting effects of the
sanctions regimes have become more unstable since China and Russia gained the ability to more
forcefully counter US foreign policies.

68

Bibliography
Academic and Journalistic References
Alexander, Kern. Economic Sanctions: Law and Public Policy. London: Palgrave Macmillen,
2009.
al-Khoei, Hayder. “Syria: The View From Iraq.” European Council on Foreign Relations. June
14, 2013.
Alvandi, Roham. Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Anthony, Ian. “Major Trends in Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.” In Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmaments and
International Security. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004: 575-601.
Anthony, Ian, Angés Allebeck, Gerd Hagmeyer-Gaverus, Paolo Miggiano, and Herbert Wulf.
“Appendix 7B: Register of the Trade in and Licensed Production of Major Conventional
Weapons in Industrialized and Third World Countries, 1990.” Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute Yearbook 1991. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991:
232-274.
Anthony, Ian, Angés Allebeck, Gerd Hagmeyer-Gaverus, Paolo Miggiano, and Herbert Wulf.
“The Trade in Major Conventional Weapons,” Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute Yearbook 1991. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991: 197-281.
“Arab League Sanctions for Syria.” BBC News. November 12, 2011.
Arnett, Eric. “Nuclear Tests by India and Pakistan,” in Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute Yearbook 1999: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1999: 371-381.
Batty, David and Jack Shenker. “Syria Suspended From Arab League.” The Guardian.
November 12, 2011.
Bapat, Navin A. and T. Clifton Morgan. “Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered:
A Test Using New Data,” International Studies Quarterly 53. 2009: 1075-1094.
Blanchard, Christopher. “Libya: Background and US Relations.” Congressional Research
Service Report for Congress. August 6, 2008.
Brigham, Robert. The United States and Iraq Since 1990: A Brief History With Documents.
Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2014.
Byman, Daniel L. “How Terrorism Helps—and Hurts—Iran.” Brookings Institute. January 6,
2020.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Pakistan’s Sanction Waivers: A Summary.”
Washington DC: October 29, 2001.

69

Carr, E. H. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939. 2nd ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1964.
Clawson, Patrick. “Iran.” In Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy, ed. Richard Haass
The Council on Foreign Relations, 1998: 85-106.
Congressional Research Service, Venezuela: Overview of US Sanctions. Washington DC:
February 2020.
Dahl, Robert A. Modern Political Analysis 4th ed. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.,
1984.
—. “The Concept of Power.” Behavioral Science 3 December 1957, 201–215.
Deger, Saadet and Somnath Sen. “World Military Expenditure.” In Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmaments. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992: 189-270.
Doxy, Margaret. “Sanctions Through the Looking Glass: The Spectrum of Goals and
Achievements.” International Journal 55. Spring 2000: 207-223.
Dugger, Celia W. “Coup in Pakistan: The Overview; Pakistan Army Seizes Power Hours After
Prime Minister Dismisses His Military Chief.” New York Times. October 13, 1999.
Early, Bryan R. Busted Sanctions: Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2015.
—. “Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Effects on the Success of
Economic Sanctions.” Foreign Policy Analysis 7. 2011: 381-402.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. “The Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.” December 14, 2018.
Frolovskiy, Dmitriy. “What Putin Really Wants in Syria.” Foreign Policy. February 1, 2019.
Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History?” The National Interest 16. Summer 1989: 3-18.
Geddes, Barbara. “What do we Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?” Annual
Review of Political Science 2. 1999: 115-144.
Gibbons-Neff, Thomas and Eric Schmitt. “U.S. Military Reviewing Iraq Operations After Two
Troops Die Fighting ISIS.” The New York Times. March 9, 2020.
Gordon, Joy. “Cold War: Economic Sanctions as a Weapon of Mass Destruction.” Harper’s
Magazine. November 2002.
—. “Introduction.” Ethics & International Affairs 33. Fall 2019.
Haass, Richard. conclusion to Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy. ed. Richard Haass
The Council on Foreign Relations, 1998: 197-212.

70

Hoskins, Eric. “The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions on Iraq.” In Political Gains
and Civilian Pain: Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions. ed. Thomas Weiss,
David Cortright, George Lopez, and Larry Minear. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers, 1997: 91-147.
Hubbard, Ben, Anton Troianovski, Carlotta Gall, and Patrick Kingsley. “In Syria, Russia is
Pleased to Fill and American Void.” New York Times. October 15, 2019.
Hudson, David. “President Obama: ‘We Will Degrade and Ultimately Destroy ISIL.’” White
House Office of Digital Strategy. September 10, 2014.
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Elliott, and Barbara Oegg. Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered 3rd ed. Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International
Economics, 2007.
Jaffe, Greg. “The Problem With Obama's Account of the Syrian Red-Line Incident: The Events
in 2013 Remain Some of the Most Hotly Debated Moments of Obama's Presidency,”
Washington Post Blogs. (October 4, 2016).
Jones, Lee. ed. Societies Under Siege: Exploring How International Economic Sanctions (Do
Not) Work. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Kaempfer, William H. and Anton D. Lowenberg. “Unilateral Versus Multilateral International
Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective.” International Studies Quarterly 43. March
1999: 37-58.
Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye. Power and Interdependence. 2nd ed. Boston: Scott,
Foresman and Company, 1989.
Krauthammer, Charles. “The Unipolar Moment.” Foreign Affairs 70. 1990-1991: 23-33.
—. “The Unipolar Moment Revisited.” The National Interest. Winter 2002-2003: 5-17.
Kupchan, Charles A. “Life after Pax Americana.” World Policy Journal 16. Fall, 1999: 20-27.
Kux, Dennis. “Pakistan,” in Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy. ed. Richard Haass.
The Council on Foreign Relations, 1998: 157-176.
Laïdi, Zaki. A World Without Meaning: The Crisis of Meaning in International Politics. trans.
June Burnham and Jenny Coulon. London: Routledge, 1998: 20-21.
Landler, Mark. “Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned.” New York Times. May
8, 2018.
Layne, Christopher. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise.” International
Security 17. Spring 1993: 5-51.
Lis, Alan. “Yemen is a Battleground in Iran’s Proxy War Against the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.”
Global Security Review. October 2, 2019.

71

Lund, Aron. “Briefing: Just How ‘Smart’ Are Sanctions Against Syria.” The New Humanitarian.
April 25, 2019.
MacFarquhar, Neil. “Hafez al-Assad, Who Turned Syria into a Power in the Middle East, Dies at
69.” New York Times. June 11, 2000.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. “Is a Science of Comparative Politics Possible?” in Against the Self-Images
of the Age. New York: Schocken Books, 1971: 260-279.
Markusen, Eric. “Three Empirical Investigations of Alleged Genocide in Darfur,” in The World
and Darfur: International Response to Crimes Against Humanity in Western Sudan. ed.
Amanda Grzyb. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009: 95-111.
Mearsheimer, John J. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War.”
International Security 15. Summer 1990: 5-56.
—. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security 19. Winter 19941995: 5-49.
—. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics updated ed. New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 2014.
Niblock, Tim. “Pariah States” and Sanctions in the Middle East. London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2001.
Nye, Joseph. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs,
2004.
Oskarsson, Katerina. “Economic Sanctions on Authoritarian States: Lessons Learned.” Middle
East Policy 19. Winter 2012: 88-102.
O’Sullivan, Meghan L. Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism.
Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
Otterman, Sharon. “Iraq: Oil for Food Scandal.” Council on Foreign Relations. October 28,
2005.
“Pakistan-US Relations.” OxResearch Daily Brief Service. July 1986.
Peksen, Dursun. “Autocracies and Economic Sanctions: The Divergent Impact of Authoritarian
Regime Type on Sanctions Success.” Defense and Peace Economics 30. 2019: 253-268.
—. “Political Effectiveness, Negative Externalities, and the Ethics of Economic Sanctions.”
Ethics & International Affairs 33. Fall 2019: 279-289.
Peterson, Timothy. “Reconsidering Economic Leverage and Vulnerability: Trade Ties, Sanction
Threats, and the Success of Economic Coercion.” Conflict Management and Peace
Science 2018: 1-21.

72

Pietrobon, Alessandra. “Nuclear Powers' Disarmament Obligation under the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty:
Interactions between Soft Law and Hard Law” Journal of International Law 27. March
2014: 169-188.
Power, Samantha. “Kosovo: A Dog and a Fight.” In A Problem from Hell: America and the Age
of Genocide. New York: Harper Perennial, 2007.
Reeves, Eric. “Death in Darfur: Total Mortality from Violence, Malnutrition, and Disease:
April/May 2006,” in The World and Darfur: International Response to Crimes Against
Humanity in Western Sudan. ed. Amanda Grzyb. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2009: 152-180.
Rezaei, Farhad. “JCPOA Collapse: Will Proliferation Follow?” Middle East Policy 26. Summer
2019: 48-61.
Russett, Bruce and Harvey Starr. World Politics: The Menu for Choice 3rd ed. New York: W. H.
Freeman and Company, 1989.
Singhvi, Anjali, Edweard Wong, and Denise Lu. “Defying US Sanctions, China and Others Take
Oil from 12 Iranian Tankers.” New York Times. August 3, 2019.
Steinberg, Dmitri. “Trends in Soviet Military Expenditure.” Soviet Studies 42. October 1990.
“Sudan Crisis: What You Need to Know.” BBC News. August 16, 2019.
Venema, Vibeke. “The Sahara Memorial Seen from Space.” BBC World Service. January 22,
2014.
Verhoeven, Harry, Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, and Madhan Mohan Jaganathan. “To Intervene in
Darfur, or Not: Re-examining the R2P Debate and Its Impact.” Global Society 30. 2016.
von Soest, Christian and Michael Wahman. “Are Democratic Sanctions Really
Counterproductive?” Democratization 22. 2015: 957-980.
Tyler, Patrick E. “Lone Superpower Plan: Ammunition for Critics.” The New York Times. March
10, 1992.
“UN Sanctions Against Iran.” BBC News. July 26, 2010.
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control. Nicaragua Sanctions
Regulations 31 CFR Part 582. Washington DC: September 2019.
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Public Affairs. Treasury Issues Changes to
Strengthen Cuba Sanctions Rules. Washington DC: September 2019.
Wallensteen, Peter, Carina Staibano, and Mikael Eriksson. ed. Making Target Sanctions
Effective: Guidelines for the Implementation of UN Policy Options. Uppsala: Uppsala
University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2003.

73

Waltz, Kenneth N. “Evaluating Theories,” The American Political Science Review 91. December
1997: 913-917.
—. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
1979.
Wang, Shaoguang. “Estimating Defense Expenditure: Some Evidence from Chinese Sources.”
The China Quarterly 147. September 1996.
Weiss, Thomas, David Cortright, George Lopez, and Larry Minear. ed. Political Gain and
Civilian Pain: Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions. Lanham: Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers, 1997.
Wohlforth, William. “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24. Summer
1999: 5-41.
Zakaria, Fareed. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
Policy Documents
African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur. “The Establishment of Peacekeeping
Operations.”
Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Public Law 90-629 as amended through PL 115-232. 94th
Congress, 2nd session. June 30, 1976.
Council of the European Union. “Press Release 197: EU Extends Sanctions Against Syria.”
June 23, 2011.
Bush, George H. W. Executive Order 12722. “Blocking Iraqi Government Property and
Prohibiting Transactions With Iraq.” August 3, 1990.
Bush, George W. Executive Order 13303. “Protecting the Development Fund for Iraq and
Certain Other Properties in Which Iraq has an Interest.” May 22, 2003.
—. Executive Order 13338. “Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting the Export of
Certain Goods to Syria.” May 11, 2004.
—. Executive Order 13400. “Blocking Property of Persons in Connection With the Conflict in
Sudan’s Darfur Region.” April 26, 2006.
Clinton, William. Executive Order 12957. “Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the
Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources.” March 15, 1995.
—. Executive Order 12959. “Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran.” May 6,
1995)\.
—. Executive Order 13059. “Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran.” August
19, 1997.

74

—. Executive Order 13067 “Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting
Transactions With Sudan.” November 3, 1997.
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2000. HR
3196, 106th Congress, 1st session. November 5, 1999.
International Atomic Energy Agency Director General. “Verification and Monitoring in the
Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231
(2015).” International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Directors. March 3, 2020.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. “9/11 Commission Report.”
August 21, 2004.
Obama, Barack. Executive Order 13572. “Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to
Human Rights Abuses in Syria.” April 29, 2011.
—. Executive Order 13582. “Blocking Property of the Government of Syria and Prohibiting
Certain Transactions With Respect to Syria.” August 17, 2011.
—. Executive Order 13671. “Recognizing Positive Actions by the Government of Sudan and
Providing for the Revocation of Certain Sudan-Related Sanctions.” January 13, 2017.
Office of Foreign Assets Control. “List of Foreign Sanctions Evaders Sanctioned Pursuant to
Executive Order 13608.” March 17, 2020.
Reagan, Ronald. Executive Order 12613. “Prohibiting Imports from Iran.” October 29, 1987.
“The Commerce Control List.” Code of Federal Regulations Title 15 Part 774.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Public Law 87-195 as amended through PL 116-92. 87th
Congress, 1st session. September 4, 1961.
The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. Public Law 104-172, 104th Congress, 2nd session.
August 5, 1996.
“The United States Munitions List” Code of Federal Regulations Title 22 Part 121.
Trump, Donald J. “Remarks on United States Military Operations in Syria.” 2018 Daily
Presidential Briefing 242. April 13, 2018.
—. Executive Order 13846. “Reimposing Certain Sanctions With Respect to Iran.”
August 6, 2018.
United Nations Security Council. Resolution 600. August 2, 1990.
—. Resolution 661. August 6, 1990.
—. Resolution 678. November 29, 1990.
—. Resolution 706. August 15, 1991.
—. Resolution 731. January 21, 1992.
75

—. Resolution 748. March 31, 1992.
—. Resolution 883. November 11, 1993.
—. Resolution 1483. May 22, 2003.
—. Resolution 1506. September 12, 2003.
—. Resolution 1591. March 29, 2005.
—. Resolution 1737. (December 23, 2006).
—. Resolution 2231. (July 20, 2015).
—. “Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005) Concerning
the Sudan: Background Information.”
United States Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism. “State Sponsors of Terrorism.”

76

